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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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QUINTON BUNN,
Claimant-Appellant,

) SUPREME COURT NO. 36024-2009

v.

HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY, Employer,
and LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Surety,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
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CLAIMANT: QUINTON BUNN

BY:

Se~-wofApPe~S-

I-.

mmdonATSb~-

KENTA. HIGGINS
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

DEFENDANTS: HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY, Employer and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORPORATION, Surety

BY:

E. SCOTT HARMON
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707

BEFORE TIHE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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STATE OF IDAHO

CLAIMANT: QUINTON BUNN
BY:

KENT A. HIGGINS
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

DEFENDANTS: HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY, Employer and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORPORATION, Surety
BY:

E. SCOTT HARMON
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707
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LIST OF EXHlBITS

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT:

TAKEN JUNE 11,2008 RE: QUINTON BUNN
TO BE LODGED WITH THE SUPREME COURT.

CLAIMANT'S EXHIBITS:
1.

Claimant's Exhibits QB052908-1 through QB052908-46;
(No description provided by Claimant)

DEFENDANTS' EXHIBITS:
Notice of Injury dated 4130105
LNW Denial letter dated 5/4/03

Claimant's written response to denial letter
Claimant's personnel file
Deposition transcript Carol Beckstead taken 5119108
Deposition transcript Claimant Quinton Bunn taken 12110107
Brett A. Smith, PA, chart notes dated 512105-5120105
Vernon S. Esplin, MD, chart notes dated 5120105-12119106
Bear Lake Family Physician ER note
Radiology reports dated 512105-8128106

K.

Operative reports

L.

Deposition transcript of Lisa Harvey taken 5119108

LIST OF EXHIBITS (docket # 36024-2009 RE: QUINTON BUNN) - (i)

OMMISSION, JUDICIAL DMSION, P.O.

SEND ORIGINAL TO: LNDUSTI

/

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMPLAINT

I

C1,AIMANT.S (MIURED W O R K E R ) N M AND ADDRESS

I

Quinton Bunn
226 N. 1 1 I h
Montpelier, ID 83254

I TELEPHONE MnlWER:(208) 221-4409

CLAIMANT'SSOCIAL SECURITY NO.

I

&kLc--

CLA1MAN'T.S ATTORNEY'S NAME,

gT2dv

t

I

ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER

Kent A. Higgins
Merrtll & Merr~ll.Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

I

1 (208) 232-2286
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRaRS
(NOT ADJUSTER'S ) NlUva AND ADDRESS

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS (at time of injuly)
Heritage Safe Co.
20 Industrial Park
Grace, ID 83241

I

1720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041

Liberty Northwest
6213 North Clovedale Road, Suite 150
P.O. Box 7507
Boise, ID 83707-7507

CLAIMANT'SBIR'EDATE

WHEN INJURED, CLAIMANT WAS EARNRJG AN AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE

STATE AND COUNTY M W 3 C H MrnY OCCURRED

Caribou County, Idaho

OF: $

I

10.00

.PURSUANT TO TDANO CODE 8 72-419
I

I

Il.\i'Pl:NI;I))
Clairnimt \\.a$
installing iocks on jnfrs \\'hitc twisting a sciuwdri\c, (:laimam felt something g i \ c ua)" in lhis xrrisl.
!ll:Si'Rl8F

HOW !YIIIRY O R OCCIYAl ION.11 DISEASE OCCIXRED H l I A T

NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A

RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

Tom ligament in wrist

,...,
...,"
.

WHAT WORKER'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THIS TIME?

.>

...,

J

... .

;-..7

I.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8,

TTDITPD benefits;
PPI benefits;
Disability in excess of impairment;
Medical bills paid;

Payment of travel, meals and lodging:~gp@nseBfor
medical treatment;
-.. . n u.2
Future medical bills;
;7
. . .:
Attorney fees; and
Retraining benefits or total permanentberiefits:l,>
--L

. , ,.

TO WHOM NOTICF~WASG I U ~ N

DATE ON WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO EMPLOYER
04/03/05
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN
OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

E3

0

ORAL

WRITTEN

ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED
1.
2.

3.
4.

TTDITPD benefits;
PPI benefits;
Disability in excess of impairment;
Medical bills paid;

5.
6.
7.
8.

Payment of travel, meals and lodging expenses for medical treatment;
Future medical bills;
Attorney fees; and
Retraining benefits or total permanent benefits.

NO IF SO,
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? C3 YES
PLEASE STATE WHY
Following claimant's injury the surety arranged for Claimant to obtain treatment. He received medication and x-rays. Later, he received a letter from the
surety stating that his injuries were non-compensable. (See attached Exhibit A).

NOTICE: COMPLAMTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITYFUND MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH IDAHO CODE

IC 1001 (Rev. 110112004)

(COMPLETE OTHER SIDE)
Appendix 1

Complaint - Page 1 of 3

4=

PHYslCl4Ns WHO TREAWD CLAlMANT

AND,

a s )

Dr. Kenneth Newhouse
560 Memorial Drive
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-4073

Dr. N.E.. Wolff
4536 Washington Street
Montpelier, ID 83254-1544

Dr. Vernon Esplin
560 Memorial Drive
Pocatello, ID 83201

Dr. Pat Farrell
500 S 11" Ave Ste 504
Pocatello, ID 83201

WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU INCUlRRED TO DATE? In excess of $28.00235
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS IiAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID, IF ANY? $

WliAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU PAID. IF ANY? -$28,002.35

I AM JNTERESTED IN MEDIATING T R I S CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.
D4TE

o NO

&S

SIGNATURE OF CLAMANT OR ATTORNEY

PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW
ONLY IF CLAIM IS MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS
NAME ANC SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER OF PARTY
PILING CUtdPLAmT

I

I

DATE OF DEAW

I

WAS FlLMG PARTY DEPElOENl ON DECEASED?
oYES
0 NO

DD) FlLMG PARTY LIVE WITH DECEASED AT T W O F ACCiDFXS?
0,
0 NO

CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM
CERTIXICATE OF SERVICE
1hereby cedify that on the ____

day of

ZOO-,

T caused to be sewed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint upon:
SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

EMP1,OYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

(Put in lines)

via

0

personal sewice of process

0

regular U.S.

via:

Mail

0

personal service of process

D

regular U.S. Mail

-

Stgnature

i<Gn"CE: An Employer or Intsuranee Comprinty sen-eciwith a e'onmpltrint must Tie an Answer on F o m P.C.
1003 with the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certif~cateof
mailing to avoid default. If no answer isfled, a Default Award may be entered1
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
84720-0041 (208 334-6000.
(COMPLETE MEDICAL RELEASE FORM ONPAGE 3)

-

Complaint Page 2 of3

d

Patient Name:
Birth Date:
Address:
Phone Number: J208)
SSN or Case Number

JXDUSTRIAL COMMtSSION
P.O. Box 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041

ontpelier. ID

AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALmORMATION
I hereby authorize
to disclose health information as specified
Provider Name - must be spec$c for each provider
To:
Insurance Com,pany/Third Parry Adminislrafor/SelfInst~redEmplor~(~r/I~TIF,
the+ aftornep nrp:r:ient's attornr):
Street Address
.-

City
State
Purpose or need for data:
(e.g. Worker's Compensation Claim)

Information to be disclosed:
0
Discharge Summary
History& ~ h ~ s i c a l - ~ x a m
Consultation Reports
Operative reports
Lab
Pathology
Radiology Reports
Entire Record
Other: Specify

Zip Code

Date@)of Hospitalization/Care: 04/03/05 to present

I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable):
0
AIDS or HIV

17
0

Psychiatric or Mental Health Information
DruglAlcohol Abuse Information

I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by federal Law (rt CRF Part 164) and that
the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I understand
that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking the authorization
won't apply to information already released in response to this authorization. 1 understand that the provider will not condition
treatment, payment enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless othenvise revoked, this
authorization will m i r e upon resolution o f worker's compensation claim Provider, its employees, officers, copy service
contractor, and physicians are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to
the extent indicated and authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes
release of all information specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be directed to the
specified above.

c/cz,5-/' 7

.r

6 t e

/

/

Signature of Legal Representative & Relationship to PatientLAutltority to Act Date
Signature of Witness
Original Medical Record Copy:

Title
Patient

Date

Complaint - Page 3 of 3

SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIA-

/

>MMISSION, JUDICIAL DMSION, P.O. BOW 720, BOISE, WAHO 83720-0041

AMENDED WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMPLrn
C i nTMAYT S (INJwzD

1

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME. ADDRESS A
N
D TELEPHOkT NWvfBER

WORKER) NAME AND ADDRCSS

I

I

Quinton Bunn
226 N. I I I h
Montpelier, ID 83254

Kent A. Higgins
Menill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocalello. ID 83204-0991

TELEPHONE NUMBER:(208) 221 -4409

(208) 232-2286

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS (at time of injury)

WORKERS' COMPENSATIONINSURANCE CARRIERS
(NOT ADJUSTER'S )NAME AND ADDRESS

Heritage Safe Co.
20 Industrial Park
Grace, ID 83241

I

CLAIMANTS SOCIAL SECURITY KO

Liberty Northwest
6213 North Clovedale Road, Suite 150
P.O. Box 7507
Boise. ID 83707-7507

________r

!

DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPA TIOSAI. DTSEASB

CLAMANT'S BIRTKDPIZ

04130105

I

I

--I

b i 4 T E AND COUNTY W WHICH INJURY OCCURRED

I

Caribou County, Idaho

I

I

-

--i

WHiN INJWVsD. CLAIMANT WAS EARNlNG AM AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE
OF: $

,PI,RSUAM TO IDAHO CODE 8 72-419

10.00

I

I

I

I

DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OF. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHKT HAPPENED)

Claimant was installing locks on safes. White twisting a screwdrive, Claimant felt something "give way" in his wrist.

---

.-.

.
SATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEh4S ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

'Tom ligament in wrist

.-

-

I.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

TTDrrPD benefits;
PPI benefits;
Disability in excess of impairment;
Medical bills paid;

,.

,.. -.

!
..-.
.,/I

WHAT WORKER'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THIS TIME?

..~".,

--

:.2
,
'.a
-4

.medical trearmsnt:
Payment of travel, meals and lodgin&$%ns@$or
Future medical bills;
3.2 m Z
i-"
I
Attorney fees; and
r
Retraining benefits or total permane(iI,a'Bnefi~
... ..-~

"

-..
, .-p
,:

TO WHOM NOTIC$

DATE ON WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO EMPLOYER
04103105
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN
OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY
ISSUE ORs1.
2.
3.
4.

Ln

My boss

0

ORAL

56s ~1v~i-Y
..

'2

c?
WRITTE?~

,z

INVOLVED
TTDITPD benefits;
PPt benefits;
Disability in excess of impairment;
Medical bills paid;

5.
6.
7.
8.

Payment of travel, meals and lodging expenses for medical treatment:
Future medical bills;
Anomey fees; and
Retraining benefits or total permanent benefits.

YES
NO IF SC.
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS?
PLEASE STATE WHY
Followine, claimant's iniuw the suretv arranged for Claimant to obtain treatment. He received medication and x-rays. Later, he received a lener from !hu

?OI (Rev. 1/0112004)

(COMPLETE OTHER SWE)
Appendix 1

Complaint - Page 1 of 2

4

-.

-.

PiIYSlCIANS WHO TREATED CLAIMANT (NAME AND ADL.;SS)
Dr. N E.. Wolff
4535 Washington Street
Montpelier, ID 83254-1544

Dr. Pat Farrell
500 S 11" Ave Ste 504

Dr. Vernon Esplin
560 Memorial Drive
Pocatello, ID 83201

Dr. Kenneth Newhouse
560 Memorial Drive
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-4073

Pocateilo, ID 83201

-

W A T MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU MCURRED TO DATE? In excess of $28,00235

-

WUT MEDICAL COSTS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID, IF ANY? f

WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU PAID, F ANY? -$28,002.35

ds

I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.
DATE

u NO

OR ArrORNEY

5 - 3 I-

-

0

7
PLEASE ANSWER THE S E T ~ QUESTIONS
F
IMMEDIATELY BELOW
ONLY IF CLAIM I S MADE FOR D E A V BENEFITS

!"

i

--

.

..

.

+

,

:,.

NAME ANDSOCIALSECURITY NUMBER OFPARTY
FlLIIjG COMPLAINT

-,.-..

-

7

m

.

I

i

WAS FLING PARTY DEPENDENTON DECEASED?
3 YES
0 NO

-.

.

DAFE OF DEAM

RELATIOX TO DECEASSD CSAIMANT

'4
I

DID FlLMG PARTY LIVE WTH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT?
0 YES
U NO

CLAMANT MliST COMPLETE, SIGN AM) DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 29TIi day of May, 2007,l causcd to be served a true and corrcct copy of the foregoing Complaint upon:
FMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

!!oritage Safe Co.
20 Industrial Park
Grace. ID 83241

Liberty Northwest
6213 Nonh Cloverdale Road.Suite 150
P.O. Box 7507
Boise, ID 83707-7507

via

D

personal service of proccss

B

regular U.S. Mail

via:

D

personal service of process

cd

regular U.S. Mail

NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance combany served with a Complaint must f i e an Answer on Form I.C.
1003 with the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of
mailing to avoid default. Ifno answer kfiled, a Default Award may be entered!

Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
84720-0041 (208 334-6000.
(COWLETE MEDICAL RELE4SE FORM ONPAGE 3)

-

Compiaiot Page 2 at:

I

Patient Name: Ouinton Bunn
Birth Date:
226 N. 1ltb.Mont~elier,ID
Address:
Phone Number: (208) 221-4409
SSN or Case Number

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
P.O. Box 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041

AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTHFORMATION
-to disclose health information as specified
I hereby authorize
,".-<;vide. f i i i ~ l e- ii:~ii.clbt:..?;r7~~.fii:f61. %omkl?:,'i~i<Je."
To:
Insurance Company/Third Party Administrator/SelfInsured Employer/ISIF, their attorneys or potient 's attorney

-

-

Street Address

City
Purpose or need for data:

Zip Code

Stale

(e.g. Worker's Compensation Claim)

Information to be disclosed:
Discharge Summary
0
History & Physical Exam
U
Consultation Reports
9
Operative reports
U
Lab
0
Pathology
3
Radiology Reports
D
Entire Record
0
Other: Specify

Date@)of Hospitalization/Care: 04/03/05 to resent

U

I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable):
il
AIDS or HIV
Psychiatric or Mental Health Information
0
C!
biug,'/~:ioh~lAbuse in;'c,rmation

I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by federal Law (rt CRF Part 164) and that
the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I understand
that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking the authorization
won't apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider will not condition
treatment, payment enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise revoked, this
authorization will w i r e w o n resolution o f worker's cornensation claim Provider, its employees, officers, copy senrice
contractor, and physicians are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to
the extent indicated and authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes
release of all information specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be directed to the
privacy officer of the Provider specified above.
Signature of Patient

Date

Signature of Legal Representative & Relationship to PatienYiiuthority to Act Date
Signature of Witness

Title

Date

'b

Send Original To: Industrial Commssion, Judicial ~ i v i d o n 317
, M a i n Street, boise, Idaho 83720-6000

I. C. NO.

ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT
ALLEGED INJURY DATE 04130105
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS
KENT A. HIGGINS
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204

2005-509704

CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS
QUINTON BUNN

226 N. 11"
Montpelier, ID 83254

WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIERS (NOT
ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORP.
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150
P.O. Box 7507
Boise, ID 83707-6358

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS
HERITAGE SAFE CO.
20 N. Industrial Park Rd.
Grace, ID 83241

ATTORNEY REPRESENTINGINDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYEWSUREN (NAME
INDEMNITY FUND (NAME AND ADDRESS)
AND ADDRESS)
E. SCOTT HARMON (lSB# 3183)
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150
P.O. Box 6358
/I Boise. ID 83707-6358
I
,
'-X The above-namedemployer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating:
- The lndustrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the lSlF by stating: m

-

-

I

,
- >

I

-7 - 7

I
.

IT IS: (Check One)
Denied

Admitted

X

I

r'l

,o

D
1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged i p h e C@plaint actually
occurred on or about the time claimed.

2

2. That the employerlemployee relationship existed.
3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the ldaho Workers' Compensation
Act.

4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly -entirely - by
an accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment.

UNDER
INVESTIGATION

UNDER
INVESTIGATION

N.A.

N.A.

5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was
due to the nature of the employment in which the hazards of such disease actually
exist, are characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or
employment.

X

6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease,
was given to the employer as soon as practical but net later than 60 days after such
accident or 60 days of the manifestation of such occupational disease.

N.A.

7. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, notice of such was given to the employer
within five months after the employment had ceased in which it is claimed the
disease was contracted.

I

8. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage
pursuant to ldaho Code, Section 72-419: $UNKNOWN
9. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the ldaho
Workers' Compensation Act.
10. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant?

NONE

I

(Continued from front)

1

1 1 . State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any
affirmative defenses.
A. Defendants deny all allegations of the Complaint not admitted herein.

B. Whether Claimant's action is time barred pursuant to I.C. §72-706.

C. Whether Claimant's condition is causally related to the alleged April 30, 2005 incident or is a result of a preexisting or subsequent condition.

/
1
1
1

D. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial impairment andlor disability in excess of impairment and
appropriate apportionment.
E Whether Claimant is entitled to TTDiTPD benefits.
F. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional medical benefits pursuant to I. C. $72-432.

G Whether Claimant is totally disabled.
H. Whether Claimant is entitled to retraining benefits.

I. Whether Claimant is entitled to any other benefits.
J. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I. C. s72-804.

K. Defendants reserve the right to amend this Answer since discovely in this matter has only just begun.
Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of sewice of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A copy
of your Answer must be mailed t o the Commission and a copy must be sewed on all parties or their attorneys by regular U.S. mail or by
personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the compensation required by law, and not cause
the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid.
Payments due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule 111(D), Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under
the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form I. C.
IAM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THlS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. -YES

-NO

DO YOU BELIEVE THlS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE.

Amount of Compensation Paid t o Date

Dated

PPI

TTD

Medical

$-0-

$-0-

$-0-

PLEASE COMPLETE
I hereby certify that on the

Kent A. Higgins
Attornev at Law
P.O. B ~ 991
X
Pocatello. ID 83204
via:
service of process
-X regular U.S. Mail

q443-7

-//d

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of JUNE, 2007,l caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon:

4
l/b-

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY:

Signature of Defendant or
Attorney

-"

E. Scott Harmon
ISB 3183
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358
Telephone (208)327-7563
FAX 800-972-3213
Employees of the Libeay Mutual Group

Attorney for Defendants
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Quinton Bunn,
Claimant,
VS.

Heritage Safe Company,
Employer,

REQUEST FOR
CALENDARING
.,.

and

g

m

Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp.,
Surety,
Defendants.

COME NOW, Defendants, Heritage Safe Co., and Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp.,
Surety, by and through their attorney of record, E. Scott Harmon, and pursuant to Rule
Vlll(C)(2) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedures of the Industrial Commission
of the State of Idaho, submit this Request for Calendaring. Defendants state:
1.

That the Defendants will be ready for hearing on or after May 1, 2008.

2.

That the desired location of the hearing is Pocatello, ID.

1 - REQUEST FOR CALENDARING

3.

The estimated length of the hearing is one-half day.

4.

The issue(s) to be heard are:

A.

Whether Claimant's action is barred pursuant to the Statute of Limitations
372-706.

5.

Defendants unavailable dates for hearing after May I , 2008, are:
May 1-2; 6-9; 23; 26-29
June 2-6; 13; 23-27
July 3; 7; 21

6.

It is unknown whether settlement can be reached in this matter.

7.

Defendants do not feel this matter requires a hearing before the full
Commission.

8.

Defendants are not aware of any other information needed by the
Commission before scheduling this case for hearing.

lIll
1111
/I//
llIl

2 - REQUEST FOR CALENDARING

DATED this

/ /-dZ day of February, 2008.
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY

/Nf
E. Scott Harmon

Attorney for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

b#
//--

I hereby certify that on the
day of February, 2008, 1 caused a copy of the
foregoing document to be served upon the following by first class mail, postage prepaid,
at the address identified below:
Kent A. Higgins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204

E. Scott Harmon

3 - REQUEST FOR CALENDARING

E. Scott Harmon
ISB 3183
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358
Telephone (208)327-7563
FAX 800-972-3213
Employees of the Liberty Mutual Group

Attorney for Defendants
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Quinton Bunn,

)
)
)
)
)

Claimant,
VS.

Heritage Safe Company,
Employer,
and
Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp.,
Surety,
Defendants.

1

)
)
)

I.C. NO.2005-509704

DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO BIFURCATE ISSUES

1
)

1
)

1
)
)

1
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COME NOW the Defendants, Heritage Safe Co. and Liberty Northwest Ins.
Corp., by and through their attorney of record E. Scott Harmon, pursuant to Rule III(E)
of the Judicial Rules and Practice of Procedure and move for an Order bifurcating the
issues in this case for hearing.

1 - DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO BIFURCATE ISSUES

This motion is made for the reason that the initial issue to be determined in the
above-entitled case is the issue related to the Statute of Limitations. This issue should
be determined prior to Claimant moving forward with any other issues.
This Motion is made and based on the pleadings and documents on file with the
Commission herein.
DATED this

OR day of February, 2008.
//
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER
& DAY

Attorney for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

-r-R

day of February, 2008, 1 caused a copy of

the foregoing document to be served by first class mail, postage prepaid, upon the
following:
Kent A. Higgins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 8,3204

0
E. Scott Harmon

2 - DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO BIFURCATE ISSUES

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

1

QUINTON BUNN,

IC 2005-509704

Claimant,
v.

) ORDER TO BIFURCATE ISSUES
)
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY.
Employer,
and

)

1

LIBERTY NORTHWEST
INSURANCE CORPORATION.

F%tED

Surety,
Defendants.
Pursuant to Defendants' Motion to Bihcate Issues and Request for Calendaring
both filed February 12, 2008, The Referee having reviewed the file herein and being fully
advised in the premises,
HEREBY ORDERS that Defendants' Motion to Bihcate is GRANTED.
FURTHER, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above..,. .,,,>,.
:,,, ,:>
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Commission Pocatello Office, at 1070 Hiline, Suite 300, City of Pocatello, County of Bannock,
State of Idaho, on the following bifurcated issue:
1.

Whether Claimant has complied with the notice and limitations
requirements set forth in Idaho Code 3 72-701 through Idaho Code
5 72-706, and whether these limitations are tolled pursuant to Idaho
Code 5 72-604.

-6.

DATED this (
l
day of March, 2008.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-ttt

I hereby certify that on the =day
of March, 2008, a true and correct copy of
the ORDER TO BIFURCATE ISSUES AND NOTICE OF HEARING was served by
U&i,i;$-@:'$;r;iT@s:c;,&~$f@;@ii"m
upon
of the following:
.,,.

..

Kent A. Higgins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
E. Scott Harrnon
P.O. Box 6358
Boise. ID 83707
and by regular United States mail to:

Sandra Beebe (Home: 208-785-5056 or Cell #: 680-3241)
P.O. Box 658
Blackfoot, ID 83221
send an e-mail.

-

ORDER TO BIFURCATE ISSUES AND NOTICE OF HEARING 2

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Claimant,

IC 2005-509704

)

1

v.

)

HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY.
Employer,
and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST
INSURANCE CORPORATION,

)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSION OF LAW,
AND RECOMMENDATION

)

FILED

Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Idaho Code 8 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned this
matter to Referee Douglas A. Donohue. He conducted a hearing in Pocatello on June 11, 2008.
Kent A. Higgins represented Claimant. E. Scott Harmon represented Defendants. The parties
presented oral and documentary evidence and submitted briefs. The case came under advisement
on September 30,2008. It is now ready for decision.
ISSUES
The sole issue to be resolved according to the notice of hearing is:
Whether Claimant has complied with the notice and limitations requirements set
forth in Idaho Code § 72-701 through Idaho Code § 72-706, and whether these
limitations are tolled pursuant to Idaho Code 5 72-604.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Claimant contends his Complaint should be deemed timely filed within the statutes of
limitation. Employer misled Claimant into believing his claim would be paid. By operation of
RECOMMENDATION - 1

Idaho Code § 72-604 or other equitable means, the limitation of Idaho Code 5 72-706 was tolled.
Defendants contend Claimant was not misled because Surety sent an appropriate denial
letter. Claimant's Complaint was filed more than one year after the claim.
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED
The record in the instant case consists of the following:
1.

Hearing testimony of Claimant and a supervisor, Carol Beckstead;

2.

Claimant's Exhibits 1 - 46; and

3.

Defendants' Exhibits A - L.

After considering the record, the Referee submits the following findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendation for review by the Commission.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Claimant was hired by Employer on March 14, 2005.

On April 25, 2005,

Claimant began working as a lock installer. This job required frequent twisting of his wrist as he
inserted screws to fasten the locks onto safes.
2.

Bor

laimant was 25 years old when this claim began.

3.

On May 2, 2005, Claimant notified Employer of a wrist problem. Employer's

records variously report the pain began April 28, 30, or May 2, 2005. He complained of
right wrist pain arising from the repetitive motion. He speculated that he suffered carpal
tunnel syndrome.
4.

Claimant first sought treatment on May 2,2005. Physician's assistant Brett Smith

diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome and restricted Claimant from using a manual screwdriver.

An X-ray showed a normal right wrist.

RECOMMENDATION - 2

5.

On May 4, 2005, Surety sent correspondence denying the claim. Surety did not

pay and has not paid any compensation to Claimant.
6.

On May 10, 2005, an MRI showed mild fiaying of the triangular fibrocartilage

complex without a tear. The radiologist suggested consideration of a vascular cause based
upon Claimant's report of "tingling" and the absence of clinically significant findings on MRI.
7.

On May 20, 2005, Claimant was examined by K.E. Newhouse, M.D. Claimant's

history included numbness, tingling, coldness, and swelling, in addition to the pain alone
which he had previously reported to physicians. Dr. Newhouse tentatively diagnosed possible
vasospasm secondary to overuse vs. possible reflex sympathetic dystrophy.

8.

A May 23, 2005 EMG and nerve conduction velocity study showed

no abnormalities.

9.

On May 27, 2005, a magnetic resonance angiography failed to indicate a

vascular component to Claimant's complaints.
10.

On May 30, 2005, Claimant sent a letter to Surety. He denied that his injury

was a carpal tunnel syndrome and affirmed that his physicians related the injury

-

whatever

it may be called in diagnosis - to his work. He requested the Surety again review its decision.
11.

Claimant continued to seek treatment and eventually underwent surgery.

12.

Claimant filed a Complaint in this matter on May 31, 2007, more than two years

after any potential date for the accident or manifestation of an occupational disease.
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER ENDINGS O F FACT
13.

Statutes of Limitation. Idaho Code (j 72-706(1) provides a one-year limit on

the filing of a Complaint where no compensation has been paid. Where some compensation has
been paid and thereafter discontinued, Idaho Code (j 72-706(2) provides a five-year limit.
RECOMMENDATION - 3

14.

Here, Claimant alleges alternatively that Employer somehow provided

compensation by authorizing medical treatment or, failing that, the authorization misled him in
such a manner as to invoke the tolling statute, Idaho Code

5

72-604. Analyzing the latter

argument first, Idaho Code 72-604 applies where an employer "willfully fails or refuses to file"
a notice of injury or change of status report. Neither condition has occurred; A Form 1 was filed
and a denial letter was sent. Idaho Code 9 72-604 does not toll the statute in this matter.
Nothing in Employer's actions reasonably served to mislead Claimant about

15.

eligibility for workers' compensation benefits. The belief or expectations about payment held
by Claimant's treaters do not establish that Claimant was misled. Neither Claimant's nor any
physician's hopes or expectations of payment can alter the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law.
Below are three reasons why.
First, Claimant received a denial letter. His subsequent request for a review

16.

does not legally require further response from Defendants. Claimant does not allege that any
oral promises were made which may have misled Claimant after he received the denial letter.
Second, nothing about Employer's alleged actions in assisting Claimant to see

17.

the first physician have created a liability for Defendants. An employer has the right to choose
a treating physician whenever the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law may apply.
Idaho Code

5

See,

72-435. The designation of an initial physician does not create any liability on

Defendants' part. Questions of causation can only be answered by a physician. The speculations
of an employee or an employer do not establish a causal link between physical complaints
and eligibility under Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. A claimant must provide medical
testimony that supports a claim for compensation to a reasonable degree of medical probability.
Langlev v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 P.2d 732 (1995).

RECOMMENDATION - 4

18.

Third, Employer's actions which occurred before Surety's denial letter do not

negate the clear expression of the denial of liability expressed therein. In their respective roles,
a surety would be expected to have more familiarity with the law than would an employer.

A surety, in large part, is primarily engaged in administering claims and benefits according to
the law. A business, in large part, is primarily engaged in making and selling a product or
service. Thus, by their expected roles, by the clear express wording of the denial letter, and by
the fact that the "last word" on the matter came through the denial letter, no reasonable person
could have been misled by Employer's alleged statements or actions which occurred upon
and immediately after receiving notice of a claimed injury or occupational disease.
19.

The Referee finds Claimant was not actually misled into thinking he need not

file a timely Complaint.
20.

Claimant's

alternative argument

-

that treatment somehow constitutes

"compensation" - is unpersuasive. The limitation statute is based upon payment. Idaho code

5 72-706.

By relevant statutory definition, "compensation" equates with "payment of

medical benefits."

Idaho code § 72-102(7); Bainbridae v. Boise Cascade Plywood Mill,

111 Idaho 79, 721 P2d. 179 (1986). Even Claimant's cited case, Park v. Mountain Valley
Timber, 200 WL 2799942 (2000), supports the proposition.

In &&, compensation was

"paid" because Employer acquiesced to Claimant's self-help method of reimbursement for
medical bills. In

w,the receipt of treatment did not trigger the five-year statute; the payment

for medical bills incurred did.
21.

Eventually, Claimant's argument would lead to the conclusion that every time

an employer designated a physician to check out a potential workers'-compensation-related
injury or occupational disease, its surety would be automatically liable for benefits regardless

-

RECOMMENDATION 5

ofwhether the potential injury or disease met the other statutory requirements as determined
by the Idaho Legislature.
22.

Claimant failed to show any basis for the application of the five-year statute,

Idaho Code 5 72-706(2). Thus, the one-year statute, Idaho Code 5 72-706(1) applies.
23.

5 72-706(1).

Claimant failed to file his Complaint within the time prescribed by Idaho Code
Claimant failed to show a basis upon which Idaho Code

5

72-604 or any other

statute or equitable doctrine should be applied to toll the limitation statute or to excuse by
some other theory his untimely filing of the Complaint in this matter. Claimant's claim should
be dismissed.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Claimant's Complaint for income benefits was not timely filed. His Complaint should
be dismissed.
RECOMMENDATION
The Referee recommends that the Commission adopt the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law as its o n and issue an appropriate final order
,--8

DATED this

,
/

J

'.

day of October, 2008.

INDUSTRIAL COMMJSSION ,

Dsglas A. Doaohue, Referee

RECOMMENDATION - 6

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

QUINTON BUNN,
Claimant,
v.
HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY,

1
1
1
1
1
1

ORDER

)

Employer,
and
LIBERTY N.ORTHWEST
INSURANCE CORPORATION,

)

Surety,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code

5

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

72-717, Referee Douglas A. Donohue submitted the record

in the above-entitled matter, together with his recommended findings of fact and conclusions
of law to the members of the Idaho Industrial Commission for their review. Each of the
undersigned Commissioners has reviewed the record and the recommendations of the Referee.
The Commission concurs with these recommendations. Therefore, the Commission approves,
confirms, and adopts the Referee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Claimant's Workers' Compensation Complaint for income benefits was not timely

filed. His Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
ORDER - 1

Pursuant to Idaho Code

2.

5

72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all

matters adjudicated.
DATED this

16

day of

(

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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Kent A. Higgins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
E. Scott Harmon
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707

ORDER - 2

,

I

OCT.

30. 2008 5:04PM

MERRILL & M E R R i l L

I,
Kent A, Higgins

1.

MElRRILL & haERRILL, CHARTERED
I09 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O.Box 991
Poqtello, ID 83204-0991
(208)232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Idaho State Bar #3025
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF'IDAHO

QUINTON BUNN,

1
I

Claimant,

I

)

X,C. No. 2005-509704

1

1

vs.

)

HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY,

1

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Employer,

1

and

LIBERTY NORTHWEST INS. CORP.,
surety,

Defendants.

)

1
1

1

1
1
)

Claimant, Quinton Bunn, brings this Motion pursuant to Idaho Code 8 72-718 and the

Judicial Rdes ofpractice and Prbcedureundw the Idaho fVorkerYsCompensationLaw, Rule 3P.

This Motion is made for the &rounds and reasons set forth in the accompanying Brief.

Motion for Reeonsideration
0:\69\6943WhadingsWtion for Reconsiddoaupd

Page l

Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Idaho State Bar #3025
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

QUINTON BUNN,
Claimant,
VS

)
)

I.C. No. 2005-509704

1

.

HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY,

)
)

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Employer,
and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST MS. CORP.,

)
)
)

1
surety,
Defendants.
)

1
1
Claimant, Quinton Bunn, brings this Motion pursuant to Idaho Code 5 72-718 and the
Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law, Rule 3F
This Motion is made for the grounds and reasons set forth in the accompanying Brief.

Motion for Reconsideration
0:\69\6943Wleadings\Motion for Reconsideration.wpd
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DATED this

6day of October, 2008.
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, one of the attorneys for the Claimant, in the
2 true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
upon the following in the inanner indicated below:
E. Scott Ha~mon
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358

do hereby certifL that
2008, served

[
]

]

Overnight Delivery
Telefax

nCT. 30. 2008 5 : 0 4 P M

NO. 905

MERRILL & MERRILL
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.--GigKent A. Higgins
ME-L
& MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthut 5th Floor
P.O. Box991 ,
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Idaho State Bar #3025
Attorneys for Claimant

-

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF 'llE STATE OF IDAHO

Claimant,

)

I.C. No. 2005-509704

)

j
H E W A ~ E SAFECOMPANY,
Employm,

j
1

BIUEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSDDERATION

)

1

and

LIE~ERTYNORTHWEST INS.
~ORP.,
surety,
Defendants.

j

1
1
1
)

1

1
1
1.

me Surotv "misIead" Ouiaton within the meanine of Idaho Code 6 72-706,

Withoutlimitingtheswpe of QuintonBunn7sdisagreematwiththereferee'sdetermination,
'

for purposes of this Brief, Quinton BU& focuses on thxee paragraphs of the determination. First

are paragraphs 15 and 16 which read as follows:

Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsicleration
0:\69\6943Wleadings\Briefin Support of Motion to Reoonsider.wpd
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Idaho State Bar #3025
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

QUINTON BUNN,
Claimant,
VS

)
)
)
)

LC. No. 2005-509704

1

.

HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INS. CORP.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF Ih' SUPPORT O F MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

1
Surety,
Defendants.

1
1
)
)

1
)

1.

The Suretv "mislead" Ouinton, within the meaning of Idaho Code 8 72-706.

Without limiting the scope of Quinton Bunn's disagreement with the referee's deterhination,
for purposes of this Brief, Quinton B u i focuses on three paragraphs of the determination. First
are paragraphs 15 and 16 which read as follows:

Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
0:\69\6943WleadingsBrief in Support of Motion to Reconsider.wpd

Page 1
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15.

Nothing in Employer's actions reasonably served to mislead
Claimant about eligibility for workers' compensation benefits. The
believe or expectations about payment held by Claimant's treaters
do not establish that claimant was misled. Neither claimant's nor
any physician's hopes or expectations of payment can alter the
Idaho workers' Compensation law. Below are three reasons why.

16.

First, Claimant received a denial letter. His subsequent request for
a review does not legally require further response from Defendants.
Claimant does not allege that any oral promises were made which
may have misled claimant after he received the denial letter.

Referee Donohue, at the both the hearing and in the briefing, was asked to consider whether
"mislead" for the purposes of Idaho Code

5

72-706 includes innocent misleading, as well as

intentional. In other words, where the surety or the employer unintentionally mislead the claimant,
by telling him he has no coverage, should the surety or the claimant bear the consequences. This
issue was never addressed in the Opinion. Exhibit 12, the letter from Liberty Nothnvest telling
Quinton that his claim did not meet the requirements of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law, is
misleading on its face. It implies Quinton's condition is a non-acute occupational disease. The
surety, no doubt, was mislead by the diagnosis of the physician's assistant. Granted, the Liberty
Northwest's letter to Quinton stating he had no coverage may have been innocent in its intent. But
nonetheless, it was misleading. Unlike the opinion of Referee Donohue, other states hold that the
employer and the surety stand i n a fiduciary relationship to the claimant. The consequences of a
mistaken denial fall on the surety and the employer, not on the claimant. For example, in Deere v.
Sarasota Countv School Bd., 880 S9.2d 825 (2005), the Court of Appeals for Florida explained:
Where an EIC [Employer / Canier] misleads a claimant about his or her rights or
availability of workers' compensation, even unintentionally, resulting in the
claimant's failure to file a timely claim, the E/C will be estopped from denying
benefits. Raymond v. Rapid Express Parcel Delivery of Tampa, 548 So. 2d 278 (Fla.
1'' DCA 1989). Because the JCC failed to consider whether Appellant demonstrated
estoppel, we REVERSE the denial of the petition for benefits and REMAND for the
JCC to make such a determination.

Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
0:\69\6943U'leadingslBrief in Support of Motion to Reconsider.wpd

Page 2

Having advised Quinton that he had no coverage, LibertyNorthwest had a duty to Quinton to correct
their denial letter when notified that his diagnosis was changed. In some states the misinformation
constitutes an estoppel against the surety's defense of Statute of Limitations. In Idaho, the
consequences of misleading is a statutory.
for vurposes of Idaho Code 72-706(2)
2. Heritage safe "~aid"co~nwensation
In paragraph 20, Referee Donohue says:
20.

Claimant's alternative argument

- that treatment somehow

constitutes "compensation" - is unpersuasive. The limitation statute
is based upon payment. Idaho code 5 72-706. By relevant statutory
definition, "compensation" equates the "payment of medical
benefits." Idaho code

5

72-102(7); Bainbridge v. Boise Cascade

Plvwood Mill, 111 Idaho 79,721 P2d. 179 (1986). Even Claimant's
cited case, Park v. Mountain Timber, 200 WL 2799942 (2000),
supports the proposition. In &&. compensation was "paid" because
Employer acquiesced to Claimant's

self-help method of

reimbursement for medical hills. In &&, the receipt of treatment did
not trigger the five-year statute; the payment for medical bills
incurred did.

According to the opinion, the exception in Idaho Code § 72-706(2) turns entirely upon the
word "payment". Such a rendering is a very strict interpretation,not a liberal interpretation in favor
of claimants, as required by the Worker's Compensation Law. By the referee's interpretation &&
Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
0:\69\6943Wleadings\Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider.wpd

v. Mountain Timber , 200 WL279942 (2000), turns purely on the fact that the claimant stole
sufficient property from the employer to make a "self help" payment by the employer for the medical
benefits. Such is not, nor ought not to be, the Idaho law. By

interpretation the phrase "when

payments of compensation have been made" would not include medical benefits. But the Idaho
Supreme Court determined in Bainbridae v. Boise Cascade Plwood Mill Co., 111 Idaho 79,721
P2d. 179 (1986), that the phrase "payments of compensation" when liberally construed, includes
payment of medical benefits. By the same policy, "payment" of medical benefits would also include
furnishing of medical benefits, providing of medical benefits, or authorization of medical benefits,
as it does in other states.
.In McNeillvv. Farm Stores. Inc., 553 So.2d 1279 (1989), the courtreachedthe opposite conclusion
of that of the Referee in Quinton's case. The court explained:
Here, Dr. Cather was McNeilly's authorized physician at the time of the injury, and
remained so at the time of his September 1987 visit, which was within two years of
the employer's last payment of benefits. The fact that McNeilly paid for the visit
personally is also irrelevant, in that the significant event is the rendition ofremedial
treatment before the expiration of the two year period, and not the payment of the bill
therefore. Seamco at 900. Therefore, the JCC erred in holding that the September
1987 visit was not furnished by the employerlcarrier so as to revive the limitations
period on that date, and the April 10, 1988 claim for benefits was timely filed.
This is not the case, as Referee Donahue implies, where the employer sends the claimant to
the doctor to examine. This case has "treatment" written all over it.

Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
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CONCLUSION

Other paragraphs of the opinion could be specifically addressed,but since the whole opinion
follows the logic of expressed in the three cited above, these illustrate the error in the approach of
the opinion.
For these reasons Claimant requests that the opinion be reconsidered. The fact Exhibit 12
is, on its face, misleading in denying claimant benefits because of an occupational disease, and the
fact that the treatment receiBd by Claimant was authorized should lead to the opposite result.
DATED this s p a y of ~ctober,2008.
MERRILL & MSjPRILL, CHARTERED
By:
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Insurance Corporation, by and through their attorney of record, E. Scott Harmon, and,
pursuant to J.R.P. Rule 3(F) hereby object and respond to Claimant's Motion for
Reconsideration.

1 - DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

1.

INTRODUCTION

On October 2, 2008, I.C. Referee Donohue issued his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation in this case determining that Claimant's
filing of a Complaint in the instant matter was governed by the one-year statute of
limitations set forth in I.C. §72-706(1) rather than the five-year statute of limitations set
forth in I.C. §72-706(2); that Claimant was not misled into thinking that he did not need
to file a timely Complaint; and, that the Claimant's May 31, 2007, Complaint regarding
the asserted late April or early May, 2005, onset of pain in Claimant's right wrist did not
meet the statute of limitations.

The Commission unanimously adopted Referee

Donohue's recommendation as their own on October 10, 2008.
On October 30, 2008, Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and supporting
Brief. This writing constitutes Defendants' response thereto.

N.
ARGUMENT

In a nutshell, Claimant, relying upon two Florida cases', renews his arguments
previously submitted to and ruled upon by this Commission that either Claimant's
misunderstanding of his condition absolves him of any responsibility to timely pursue his
claim or that, in the alternative, under the facts presented, the Commission ought
somehow construe a "payment of compensation" made in order that the five-year statute
1

Both Deere v. Sarasota County School Board, 880 So.2d 825 (2005) and McNeilly v. Farm Stores, 553
So.2d 1279 (1989) explore a Florida judiciary's treatment of Florida's statutory language arising under a
Florida scheme of statutes of limitation very different from the formulation provided us by the Idaho
Legislature. Of even greater interest, even Florida has limited the scope of its McNeilly decision. See,
Continental Can Co. v. Bailey, 668 So.2d 695 (1996).

2 - DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

of limitations set forth in I.C. §72-706(2) may be applied. In sum, Claimant's Motion for
Reconsideration seeks nothing more than a Commission re-weigh of evidence already
thoroughly weighed and decided upon.

A.

Claimant's Misunderstandina Does Not Excuse His Failure to Timely File a

Complaint.
The thrust of Claimant's argument, as it was during initial hearing and briefing in
this case, is that Claimant's failure ought be excused because Surety's denial denied
coverage for the condition Claimant and his health care provider initially said he suffered
from, not the condition he was ultimately found to suffer from. In Myers v. Quest, 144
ldaho 280, 160 P.3d 437 (2007), citing Bainbridge v. Boise Cascade Plywood Mill, 110
ldaho 79, 82,721 P.2d 179, 182 (1986), the Court again recognized that:
Statutes of limitation are clearly creatures of legislative enactment and not
within the domain of the judiciary to impose.
Though recognizing that the Legislature had provided various instances under which the
statutes of limitation may be tolled, the Court recognized that:
The Legislature has not provided that the statute of limitations.. .is tolled by
the employer's failure to inform its employees of its requirements of that
section.
Myers, 160 P.3d at 438.
Nor are Defendants required to issue iterative denials as Claimant and his health
care providers change their diagnoses. In Ewing v. Holton, 135 ldaho 792, 25 P.3d 103
(2001), Claimant initially filed a claim for an asserted carpel tunnel syndrome arising out of
her repetitive work as a dental hygienist. Through further care, the condition was later
potentially diagnosed as fibromyalgia. Following an IME provided by the Employer and
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Surety, State Fund denied the claim on the basis that no physician could, on a more
probably than not basis, tie her condition to her employment. Nine months after the SIF
denial and some 15 months after Claimant's first asserted date of injury, upon yet another
physician's diagnosis, Claimant filed a new claim along with a Complaint now asserting
her condition to be RSD. Rejecting Claimant's argument that the Commission ought not to
have held against her to the fact that she was unaware of the condition she actually
suffered until after the one-year statute of limitations on her first claim expired, the Court
affirmed the Commission's dismissal of Claimant's Complaint for failure to have filed within
the one-hear statute of limitations. Id. at 109 - 110, 25 P.3d at 796 - 797.
Claimant has not demonstrated that any action or alleged statement by either
Employer or Surety come under these facts, misled him into his prejudice.

B.

There Was No "Payment of Compensation" Upon Which to Premise Application of

the Five-Year Status of Limitations.
Claimant's reliance on the Florida McNeilly case is misplaced. There, the Florida
court interpreted an unusual provision in Florida statute under which a previously granted
authorization to follow up with a treating physician need not be renewed unless more than
two years had elapsed between treatments. Id. at 1280. The Florida court determined
that, under that statutory scheme, Claimant's entitlement was driven by the date upon
which the care was rendered, not the date upon which payment for the care was made.
Id. at 1281. McNeilly has no persuasive impact on the instant matter.

Claimant continues to urge that the phrase "payments of compensation" in
§72-706(2) or, presumably, the phrase "no compensation...p aid thereon" as used in
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§72-706(1), really doesn't require "payment", despite the clear use of the term. Rather,
Claimant castigates the Referee and Commission by asserting that the Commission's
interpretation of Park v. Mountain Timber, I.C. 97-000347, 2000 WL 279942 (Feb. 17,
2000) "turns purely on the fact that the Claimant stole sufficient property from the employer
to make a 'self help' payment by the employer for the medical benefit." Claimant's Brief is
Support, pp. 3-4.

Claimant, however, ignored the Referee's language clearly

demonstrating that it was not Park's thievery which formed the basis for the determination
of "payment" in that case but, rather, employer Mountain Timbers' acquiescence in
Claimant's self help methodology which demonstrates the "payment."

111.
CONCLUSION

Apparently conceding that there is no support in either Idaho Statute, Rule, or
Case Law to support his unusual argument, Claimant has turned to a Florida court's
interpretation of Florida's statute to support his request that the Commission re-weigh
evidence previously submitted and ruled upon. Statutes of limitation are, though, as
recognized in Bainbridge and Myers, both supra, uniquely creatures of legislative
creation. There is no provision in Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law which mirrors
the Florida statutory scheme interpreted by the Florida court. Claimant has failed to
demonstrate any error in the Referee's Decision of October 2, 2008, which the
Commission has fully adopted as its own.
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Respectfully submitted this

PRday of November, 2008.
/ALAW OFFICES OF HARMON & WHITTIER

d

B . E. Scott Harmon

L

Attorney for Defendants
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P. 0. Box 991
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/d/
E. Scott Harmon
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and
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j
\

Surety,
Defendants.

ANALYSIS
The question to be decided on reconsideration is: Can the Surety or Employer avoid the five
year allowance to file a claim, provided for in Idaho Code 5 72-706(2) by simply not paying for

Claimant's Reply Brief
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treatment the Surety or Employer has authorized. In the Order of October 10, 2008, Referee
Donohue says: "Claimant's alternateargument - that treatment somehow constitutes 'compensation'
is unpersuasive." Recommendation, ¶ 20. Mostjurisdictionswould disagree with that conclusion
by the referee. In contrast, overwhelmingly, the majority of jurisdictions are persuaded that
treatment is compensation. Thus, when the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, when posed
with the very same question in Frank v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, 96 Colo. 364,43
P.2d 158 (1935), framed the question as follows:
To obviate this purported defense, and avoid the apparent bar, the claimant relies
upon the sentence immediately following the passage just above quoted, namely:
'This limitation shall not apply to any claimant to whom compensationhas been paid.
He conten'ds that the furnishing of the services rendered by, or under the direction of,
the company's physician constituted- in view of the power and authority granted the
physicianby the company's contract described below -the payment of compensation
within the meaning of the language used.
96 Colo. at 369-70.

In answer to the question the Court said:
Whether the company would have been charged with such responsibility if it had
not had actual notice or knowledge need not be now determined or considered.
Here such notice or knowledge was proved. And by the express terms of the
contract, the treatment was to be given just as was done. This, so far as the
claimant is concerned, was (at least under the facts shown herein) the exact
equivalent afpayment;

96 Colo. at 372. (Emphasis added).
Similarly, inOklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Nolen, 164 Okla. 213,23 P.2d 381 (1933),
the Oklahoma Supreme Court analyzed:
In the case at bar, claimant was not paid compensation, but was furnished medical
treatment for more than a month. The case therefore presents a question of first
in~pressionin this state, viz., whether or not the furnishing of medical treatment alone
is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations (section 7301, supra).
We are of the opinion that the furnishing of medical treatment recognizes liability
arid constitutes the equivalent of thepayment of compensation, and is sufficient to
toll the statute.
23 P.2d at 382. (Emphasis added).
Claimant's Reply Brief
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In the State of New York, the Supreme Court analyzed:
Even though the usual medical care which is regarded as an advancepayment of
compensation is one in which the employer directly retains the physician, or the
physician or nurse is in the general employment of the employer, it seems clear that
within the intent of the statute, a direction to a claimant to get medical care, which
he literally follows, and as a result of whichmedical care is actually given, can also
constitute hrnishing of medical treatment.
Colangelo v. B.S. McCarey Company,

13 A.D.2d 592.(1961). (Emphasis added).

In Cantone v. Health Enterprises Management, Inc., 308 A.D.2d 646,764 N.Y.S.2d
294 (2003), the Supreme Court, Appellate Division of New York explained:
However, "remunerationin theform of wages or medical treatment may constitute
advance payments o f compensation, rendering inapplicable the limitations period
established by workers' Compensation Law 28, where the remuneration is provided
in recognition of liability."
397 A.D. 2d at 647. (Emphasis added).
In Arkansas, the Court of Appeals, in Plante v. Tyson Foods, lnc., 46 Ark. App. 22,876
S.W.2d 723 (1 984) expressed the following:
The supreme court has held that the furnishing of medical services constitutes
payment of compensation in the context of this statute, and that such "payment"
suspends the running of the time for filing a claim for compensation.
26 Ark. App. at 24. (Emphasis added.)
In accord is the Missouri Court of Appeals, which, in
Assembly Division, 637 S.W.2d

McDaniel v. General Motors

194 (1982) reasoned as follows:

As pertinent here, the claim must be filed within one year after the injury or within
one year after payment has been made by reason of the injury. Medicaltreatment of
a disability has been interpreted as being a payment, and a claim filed within one
year thereafter is timely. Welborn v. Southern Equipment Co., 395 s.W.2d 119,124
(Mo hanc 1965); Lloyd v. County Electric Co., 599 S.W.2d 57,60 (Mo.App. 1980).
The question then, is whether the supplying of salve and directing its applicationby
the employer's nurse constituted medical treatment, for the claim was filed within
one year thereafter. Certainly, if an employer's doctor's advice that an employee take
warm water soaks for an ankle injury constitutes medical treatment, as in Faries v.
ACF Industries, 53 1 S.W. 2d 93,99 (Mo.App. 1975), or, similarly, a company nurse
supplying an ace bandage for a sore knee tolls the statute as in Morgan v. Krey
Claimant's Reply Brief
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packing Co., 403 S.W.2d 668,670 (Mo.App.1966), a fortiori the salve prescribed for
a bad back likewise tolls the statute. The claim was thereby timely.
637 S.W.2d, at 195-196. (Emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of ~ennesseeapplied the same logical approach in Universal
Underwriters Insurance Co., v. A.J. King Lumber Company, 553 S.W. 2d 749(1977).

Therein

the court reasoned:
The.furnishing of medical services by a physician employed by the employer or
insurer is such a "voluntary payment of compensation." Reed v. Genesco, Inc.,
Tenn., 512 S.W.2d 1 (1974); Fields v. Lowe furniture Corp., 220 Tenn. 212, 415
S.W. 2d 340 (1967). The fact that no "payments" were made from November 16,
1972, the date of the first payment, until January 21,1973, when they were resumed
did not constitute a "ceasing: within the meaning of the statutory proviso.

553 S.W.2d, at 750. (Emphasis added).
Likewise in Spencer v. Stone Container Corporation, 72 Ark.App. 450,38 S.W.3d 909
(2001), the Court of Appeals of Arkansas Third Division explained:
Our oft-stated rule is that for purposes of the aforementioned statute of limitations,
"tlze,furnishing of medical services constitutes payment of compensation
Heflin v. Pepsi Cola, 244 Ark. 195, 197,424 S.W.2d 365,366 (1968). Moreover,
an employer is deemed to be furnishing such services if it has either actual notice of
has reason to know of a claimant receiving medical treatment..

. . ."

72 Ark. App. at 456. (Emphasis added).
In McGhee v. Oklahoma Metal Heat Treating, 644 P.2d 127 (1982), the
Court of Appeals of Oklahoma Division No. 1 faced the interpretation of a statute
which reaa:
The right to claim compensation under this act shall be forever barred unless within
one (1) year after the injury or death, a claim for compensation thereunder shall be
filed with the commission. Provided, however, claims may be filed at any time
within one (1) from the date of last payment of any compensation or remuneration
paid in lieu of compensation.

Claimant's Reply Brief
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In the end, the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma concluded:
All in all, we conclude on the undisputed facts of this case that the claim was timely
filed. It was undisputed that the claimant's employer took him to the hospital and
paid his bills following the accident. It was undisputed that the insurance carrier later
told the claimant to go to a doctor.

Although Referee Donahue found "claimant's argument

-

"that treatment somehow

constitutes 'compensation'- is unpersuasive," that argument seems to have found a good deal of
traction in virtually every other jurisdiction that has considered it. In fact, it would seem even the
Supreme Court of Idaho would find some persuasion in that argument in light of its following
statement in Ryen v. City of Coeur D7AIene,115 Idaho 791,770 P.2d 800 (1989). There the court
said:
Claimant argues that the definition of compensation supplied by I.C. 4 72-102(5)
purports to include "all of the income benefits and the medical and related benefits
and medical services," and is controlling. We agree. We further view the question
to have been clearly answered in Bainbvidge v. Boise-Cascade Plywood Mill,111
Idaho 79,721 P.2d 179 (1986) and Facer v. E.R. SteedEquipment Go., 95 Idaho 608,
514 P.2d 841 (1973). In Bainbvidge we held that I.c. 4 72-706(2) "compensation"
includes both income and medical benefits for the purposes of the tollingprovisions.
There, compensation was viewed to be "a word of art under the Workman's
Compensation act and it refers to income and medical benefits..."
115 Idaho, at 793.
Referee Donohue aptly notes that "by relevant statutory definition 'compensation' equates
with 'payment of medical benefits'." He addresses the decision of Park v. Mountain Timber, 2000
Westlaw 279942 (2000), where the employer never paid for medical care, except through the selfhelp method of the claimant for reimbursement of his medical bills. Yet, in Park, the Commission
found that the requirement for payment of medical benefits had been met. Referee Donahue
distinguishes Park, noting that the compensation was "paid" through the injured employee's selfhelp method of reimbursing himself through surreptitious removal of his employer's property.
The points where Quinton takes issue with Referee Donohue's opinion are twofold: first, we
disagree with his conclusion that treatment for an occupational injury is not a medical benefit of the
Claimant's Reply Brief
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Workmen's Compensation Code; and secondly, we disagree with his conclusion that it is the actual
monetary payment to the medical provider - not the affording of care to the injured employee - that
triggers the five year statute of limitations provided for in Idaho Code 5 72-706.
Once again, other jurisdictions have looked at these very issues. Other jurisdictions are
the

virtually unanimous in reaching the opposite conclusion; i.e. they universally agree that
furnishing of the care to the employee, - it is not the payment to the doctor

-

that constitutes

"payment" for the sake of the worker's compensation statute. This is clearly the more logical
conclusion for a myriad of reasons. First, as in Idaho Code $ 72-706(2), the expression "When
payments of compensation have been made. . ." refers to payments to the injured employee. The
statute concerns itself with compensation to Idaho's laborers - not their physicians. Since medical
benefits are not "paid" to a claimant, the affording to, authorization of, furnishing to, providing for
medical benefits to an injured employee is the same as "payment" for the sake of Worker's
Compensation Statutes:
In Heflin v.

Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.,

244 Ark. 195 424 S.W.2d 365 (1968), the Supreme

Court of Arkansas addressed a similar statute that also turned on the word "payment" The court then
reasoned:
The opinion in the case points out that the holding of the Ragon case followed the
general rule that the furnishing of medical services constitutes payment of
compensation within themeaning of s 81-13 18(b) andthat such ["payment" suspends
the running of the time for filing a claim for compensation. The decision is not in
any respect based on the time at which the medical bills were paid. This holding is
sound because the claimant is "compensated"by thefurnishing of the services and
not by the payment of the charges therefor.
244 Ark. at 197. (Emphasis added).
In contrast to the analysis of the Arkansas Court of Appeals, Referee Donohue's
recommendation or findings in this case concludes: "In Park, compensation was "paid" because
employer acquiesced to claimant's self-help method of reimbursement for medical bills. In Park,
the receipt of treatment did not trigger the five year statute; the payment for medical bills incurred
did." Recommendation 20. That opinion reaches the opposite conclusion and reasoning of the
Supreme Court of Arkansas in Heflin.
Claimant's Reply ~ r i k f
0:\69\6943\Pleadings\CiaimanttsReply Brief on Motion for Reconsideration.wpddf

Page 6

4

Other courts that have considered the same issue side with the reasoning of the Arkansas
Supreme Court. For example, the District Court of Appeals in Florida decided in Gilbert v.
Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority,

674 So.2d 818 (1996), that a worker's compensation

claimant's receipt of medical care from an authorized provider for injuries causally related to his
industrial accident tolled the running of the statute of limitations, despite the claimant's failure to
request the enlployer or surety to pay the hospital servicesunder worker's compensation.
In Infante v. Mansfield Construction Company, 47 Conn.App. 530, 706 A.2d 984
(1998), the Appellate Court of Connecticut explained:
The exception is, no doubt, based upon the fact that if the employer fumishesmedical
treatment he must know that an injury has been suffered which at least may be the
basis of such a claim [for compensation]. Gesmundo v. Bush, 133 Conn. 607,612,
53 A.2d 392 (1947). In the event that a representative or agent of the employer,
authorized to send the employee to aphysician, does so, that constitutesfurnishing
medical treatmentforpurposes of the exception. Id. It is clear that the defendants
were not ignorant of the injury, and do not claim to be prejudiced in any way. Evert
i f the employer did rtot pay for the medical treatment furnished by a physician
selected by him, he has "furnished" such treatment within the meaning of the
statute if he has sent the claimant for medical treatment, thereby authorizing it.

47 Conn.App. at 535-36. (Emphasis added).
In Arvinmeritor, Inc. v. Redd, 192 P.3d 1261 (2008) the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
explained:
The issuepresented in the present matter is whether a claimant may, within two
years aper the last authorized medical treatment, when the examination and
treatment are allowed by stipulation of the employer, amend the claim to include
additional injury from the same cumulative trauma. We answer in the affirmative.
In reasoning its opinion, the court concluded:
[Wle find that Arvinmeritor, by stipulatingto the treatment by Dr. Ruffin, including
a complete examination as well as allowing for treatment and physical therapy,
Redd's continuingmedical treatment was authorized. Since this continuingmedical
treatment was authorized, the state of limitations was tolled.
192 P.3d at 1263. (Emphasis added).

Claimant's Reply Brief
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma relied upon its decision a year previous in 2007 in
American Airlines v. Hickman
Hickman, as

164 P.3d 146 (2007). The court framed the argument in

follows:

The employer argues that Ibarra v. Hitch Farms, 2002 OK 41, 48 P.3d 802, in
construing 5 43(A), holds that the operative event in determiningwhether the statute
of limitations has been tolled is not the authorization of medical treatment, but the
last payment of authorized medical treatment. Because the employer did not pay for
the claimant's examination when he was sent to the MedCenter by his supervisor, the
employer claims that the statute of limitations was not tolled.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court then grappled with the same issue that must be grappled with
in this case, namely what happens when neither the employer nor the surety actually "pay" for the
medical treatment. The Oklahoma Supreme Court then proceeded with its reasoning as follows:

In Ibarra the facts reveal that the claimant, Ibarra, had received medical treatment,
and the employer had paid for the authorized treatment. Ibarra, 2002 OK 41, f/ 2,48
P.3d 802. In the case now before this Court, no payment was made. The question
we must answer is whether the ambiguous statute construed in Ibarra excludes
tolling the statute of limitations where medical treatment was authorized, but not
payment was made for the treatment. The claimant answers that the employer
should not be able to avoid the tolling of the statute of limitations by simply not
paying for treatment if authorized We do not believe that Ibarra precludes the
date of treatment as the operative date for tolling the statute of limitations found
in 5 43(a) of title 85.
164 P.3d at 149. (Emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Tennessee faced the same issue in
Corporation, 220 Tenn. 212,415 S.W.2d 340 (1967).

Fields v. Lowe Furniture

Treatment had been furnished, but the bills

had not been paid. The Supreme Court of Tennessee addressed the issue as follows:
[Tlhe question thus presented is whether or not treatment of this employee by the
company doctor in May, 1964, tolled the statute, hereinafter to be quoted. There is
no showing that these bills for the treatment of this man up until May, 1964, or that
the bili of the doctor to whom the company doctor has referred the man to in
Nashville, had ever been paid. As a matter of fact the record is rather to the effect
that these hills had not been paid by anyone.
415 S.W. 2d at 341.

Claimant's Reply Brief
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The Tennessee Supreme Court answered the question as follows:
There is no doubt that, under the facts appearing in the record, the services rendered
for the compensable injury here establishedby the evidence operated to avoid the bar
of the statute. The company's contract recognized its liability to render, or to pay the
expense of such services, and conferred upon its physician generally authority for
furnishing those services and supplies in all cases. Hence, inasmuch as all the
evidence shows that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury of which the
company forlhwith received actual notice and knowledge, the treatment given him
fell within the class which, under both the statute and the contract, imposed upon the
company unqualified financial responsibility. This, so far as the claimant is
concerned, was (at least under the facts shown herein) the exact equivalent of
payment; and he was thereby exempted from the requirement of serving the
commission with written notice, because "compensation has been paid"
220 Tenn. at 217-218. (Emphasis added).
Likewise, in Seamco Laboratories v. Pearson,424 So.2d 898 (1983), the District Court
of Appeals for Florida reasoned:
The deputy commissioner in the case subjudice correctly noted that even though Dr.
Molloy did not submit a bill or a report to the employerlcarrier within the two-year
period, as the Vincent physician did, he rendered remedial treatment before the
expiration of the two-year period. It is tire re media^ treatment that toCls the statute,
not the report of the treatment.
424 So.2d at 899-900. ( ~ m ~ h a sadded).
is
Also, the Court of Appeals for Kansas, in Sparks v. Wichita White Truck Trailer Center,
Inc. 7 Kan. App. 2d 383,642 P.2d 574 (1982) reasoned:
As we read the cases, in determining whether medical care is "compensation" under
the act neither the fact nor time ofpayment of the bills is determinative; the issue
is whether the medical care was authorized, either expressly or by reasonable
implication. If the claimant receives medical care with the reasonable expectation of
payment by the employer the care is "compensation" when rendered even though it
may never be paid for.

***

Once the employer assumed the. responsibility of furnishing medical care the
workman was entitled to rely on that action; notice of termination to the doctor was
not notice to the claimant. In that case it appears the doctor had never been paid for
his services, but the furnishing of those services under what appeared to the
claimant to be the authority of the employer amounted to 'payment of
compensation" to the claimant.
Claimant's Reply Brief
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7 Kan. App. at 385-386. (Emphasis added).
All of this brings us back to our original question: Whether an employer or the surety can
preclude the triggering of the five year statute of limitations of I.C. 5 72-706(2) by refusing to pay
for medical care or treatment it has authorized. The answer, if rendered in virtually any other
jurisdiction, is clearly: "no," they cannot. The determining factor should be whether or not a
claimant is afforded medical treatment by the employer or surety, not whether the employer or surety
made or withheld payment for the treatment.

2. Was Quinton Bunn Mislead by Libertv Northwest.
The other issue of the decision that Quinton Bunn takes issue with is with is the following
language in the opinion:
Claimant contends his Complaint should be deemed timely filed within the
statutes of limitation. Employer misled Claimant into believing his claim would be
paid. By operation of Idaho Code 572-604 or other equitable means, the limitation
of Idaho Code 5 72-706 was tolled.
Defendants contend Claimant was not misled because surety sent an
appropriate denial letter. Claimant's Complaint was filed more than one year after
the claim.
Recommendation, p.1-2

By way of clarification, Quintons' contention is not that he was mislead into believing his
claim would be paid. His contention was that he was mislead when told by Liberty Northwest that
Idaho Worker's Compensation laws would do nothing for him. Idaho Code $ 706(1), the one year
statute of limitations, clearly provides an exception: "unless mislead to his [claimant's] prejudice
by the employer or surety." No doubt, the letter from Liberty Northwest was erroneous. It told
Quinton he could not be covered. The question to be addressed is not whether Liberty Northwest
mislead Quinton tobelieve he would be covered, but whether the consequences for a surety's error,
albeit unintentional, in informing an injured employee that worker's compensation can do nothing
for him, or her, should be suffered by the injured employee or the surety.
In Raymond v. Rapid Express, 548 So.2d 278 (1989). The First District Court of Appeal
for Florida answered the question as follows:
Where the EIC, [employerlcarrier] intentionally or otherwise,
Claimant's Reply Brief
0:\69\6943Wleadings\Claimant's Reply Brief on Motion for Reconsideration.wpddf
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misleads the claimant as to his rights or the availability of workers'
compensation benefits with the result that the claimant fails to timely
file his claim, the E/C will be estopped from asserting the statute of
limitations as a defense. Bovd v. Florida Memorial Colle~e.475
So.2d 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 19851; Foster Wheeler Enerav Group v.
Fairhurst, 405 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Catalano v.
Hillsborol~ghCountv Board o f Public Instruction. 249 So.2d 24
(Fla.1971); Jenkiw v. M.H.
Harrison Construction Companv. 228
So.2d 91 1 (Fla.1969); Enple v. Deerborne School. 226 So.2d 681
(FIa.1969); tiowanik v. Biscavne Electric, Inc.. 139 So.2d 678
(Fla.1962); Baptist Village v. Newton,--3551
(1978), cert.
denied, 368 So.2d 1362 (Fla.1979).

The Supreme Court of Wyoming also concluded, in Bauer v. State of Wyoming,95 P.2d
1.048(1 985) that a surety's innocent -but nonetheless misleading- statements to aninjured claimant
that the claimant did not have worker's compensation coverage,' was sufficient to allow an estoppel
to the State from invoking the statute of limitations as a defense. The Wyoming High Court engaged
in an lengthy analysis and a survey of the law on the same issues from other jurisdictions. Rather
than repeat that lengthy review in this brief, a copy of the opinion is included as an exhibit to this
brief.

SUMMARY
In its final analysis, this case is about a young man who suffered a serious disabling injury
to his dominant hand while doing his duty of tightening screws with a screwdriver for Heritage
Safe Company.
Heritage Safe, through Carol Beckstead, made an appointment with its preferred medical
provider, Lakeview Medical Clinic. Carol Beckstead testified, "1 tell - - at the time I tell the doctor's
office, your know, that it will be billed to Liberty Northwest at that time." All the intake documents
at the hospital indicated that Quinton Bunn was seen as a worker's comp case with the responsible
party being Heritage Safe. The First report of Injury or Illness prepared by Heritage, Exhibit 1
confirms Quinton was sent for" h-eatment." The Incident 1 Accident Investigation form, Exhibit 3
also confirms that "medical attention [was] needed.. No doubt, Heritage Safe "provided' Quinton

'

Because of the part-time nature of her work.
Claimant's Reply Brief
0:\69\6943Wleadings\Claimant's Reply Brief on Motion for Reconsideration.wpddf

with medical treatment. No doubt, Liberty Northwest mislead Quinton when it gave as its reason to
deny him coverage that: employers are not liable for " nonaccute occupational disease."
Referee Donohue, in conclusion of his recommendation opines that: "Eventually claimant's
argument would lead to the conclusion that every time an employer designated a physician to check
out a potential worker's compensation related injury or occupational disease, its surety would
automaticallybe liable for benefits regardless ofwhether the'potential injury or diseasemet the other
statutory requirements as determined by the Idaho Legislature." Recommendation 21. But this
is not that case. This case is not about the situation where the employer or the surety sends the
employee for an examination for the sole purpose of finding whether the employee is entitled to
compensation. This is

not the case where the employer or surety seeks an examination to

see

whether an injured employee is capable of returning to work. Neither Quinton, nor Liberty
Northwest, nor Heritage Safe made the argument that the Quinton was sent to Lakeview Medical
Clinic solely to determine whether he had suffered a compensable injury. He was sent for and did
receive treatment, including injections, a splint, icing instructions and pain medication. Idaho Code

5 72-432 provides for medical treatment for occupational injuries is a benefit under the worker's
compensation law.
When Idaho Code 5 72-706(2) refers to "when payments of compensation have been made,
i t is talking about payments to the claimant, because, by judicial interpretation it includes medical

benefits. It is talking about the providing or furnishing or affording of medical benefits to the
claimant. It does not mean that if the employer or the surety arrange for the claimant to receive
medical benefits, but thereafter stiff the medical provider on its bill, the surety can thereby annul the
triggering of the five year statute of limitations under 'ldaho Code

5

72-706(2). That statute is

triggered when the injured employee is furnished the treatment.
Finally, Liberty Northwest and other sureties are in the business of workers compensation
claims on a daily basis throughout every state in these great United States. They have professionals,
with years of experience, who write those denial letters. They have a battery of lawyers and
researchers to guide their decisions to send denial letters like Exhibit 12. On the other hand, injured
employees such as Quinton Bunn, young, inexperienced, working frequently for at or near minimum
wage, will usually encounter no more than one occupational injury in a lifetime.
Claimant's Reply Brief
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When the legislatureprovided that a surety who misleads a claimant cannot benefit from the
one year statute of limitations, the legislature did not say that the surety's actions must he criminal,
willful, or even negligent. Clearly, the letter written by Liberty Northwest to Quinton Bunn was
plainly wrong. Liberty Northwest stood in a superior position to correct the consequences of the
error once the error was discovered. Because Liberty Northwest ignored Quinton's helpless and
unknowledgeable effort to correct the error, either Quinton or the Suretymust hear the consequences:
either Liberty Northwest should take responsibility and help Quinton, in the manner that Idaho
Workers Compensation laws were intended to help injured employees, or Quinton must go though
life with his dominant hand disabled, paying his own medical hills, even though he injured his duties
hand performing his duties to his employer.
The question comes down to whether it is true Quinton should hear the loss, instead of
~iberty
Northwest, because Quinton believed Liberty Northwest was in a superior position to inform
him accurately as to whether he had a right to compensation. If such is the law, such ought not to
he the law.
For these reasons, Quinton Bunn would ask the commission to reconsider its October 2"d, 2008
Opinion and acknowledge the legitimacy of his claim.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of November, 2008.
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED

Claimant's Reply Brief
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Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Sherry L. BAUER, Appellant (Employee-Claimant),
v.
STATE of Wyoming, ex rel., WYOMING WORKER'S
COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee
(Objector-Defendant).
No. 84-77.
March i.1985
Claimantwho was employedpart time by to,wnasmember
of ambulance senrice sought worker's compensation
benefits for ruptured ear drum and resulting surgery. The
District Court, Carbon County, Robert A. Hill, J.,
determined that claim was barred by statute oflimitations,
and claimant appealed. The Supreme Court, Cardine, J.,
held that employer's unintentional-but-misleading
statements to claimant that claimant did not have worker's
compensation coverage because of part-time nature of her
work were sufficient to constitute estoppel and prevent
employer and State from invokingstatuteof limitations as
a defense, since claimant had valid, meritorious claim that
was not filed because of reliance upon employer's
representation.
Reversed and remanded.
Thomas, C.J. and Rooney, J., filed separate dissenting
opinions.

363 Stipulations
-

Constmction and Operation in General
363k14(10> k. Agreed Statement of Facts. Most
Cited Cases
In worker's compensation proceeding, it would be
inappropriate to find that employee's supervisor was
probably acting as nurse for attending physician at time
she suggested that employee wasprobably not covered by
worker's compensation because of minimal part-time
nature of employe's occupation as member of town's
ambulanceservice, in light of town's stipulation that town
gave such advice to its employee as result of honest
mistake.

121Clerks of Courts 79 -65
79Clerks of Courts

79k64 Powers and Proceedings in General
-

k. Nature and Extent of Authority.
Cited Cases
Although statute provides that clerk or his designee shall
review reports of injury to ascertain whether worker's
compensation case should be docketed, it was not within
province of clerk of court to determine whether case was
barred by statute of limitations, since procedural
protections provided by statute include right to judicial
decision on matter. W.S. 1977, $ 27-12-601(a),
27-12-602(a).

pJ Workers' compensation 413 -1283
4 13 Workers' Compensation
-

West Headnotes
LlJ Stipulations 36.3 -14(10)

413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation

41 3XVKF) Claims for Compensation
413XVI(F)4 Excusing Want Of, or Defect or
Delay in Making Claim
413k1283 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
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Statute of limitations for worker's compensation clain~s, Q Workers' Compensation
Injuries for Which Compensation May Be
which contains no provision for tolling because of
excusable neglect or to relieve hardship in particular Had
413V11L(E) Defenses Against Claims for
circumstances, was absolute bar to claim unless doctrine
of equitable estoppel prevented raising of statute of Compensation; Misconduct of Employee
k. In General. Most Cited Cases
limitations defense. W.S. 1977, 5 27-12-503.
Althwgh Worker's Compensation Division of State is
granted rights as broad as those of employer, applicable
statute does not confer greater rights or permit state to
p
J Estoppel 156 -52(3)
asseri defenses not available to employer. W.S. 1977, 5
27-12-608.
156 Estoppel
156111Equitable Estoppel
Workers' Compensation 413 -1114
1561IlfA~Natureand Essentials in General
Nature and Application of Estoppel in
Pais
4 13 Workers' Compensation
156k52(3) k. Estoppel by Conduct. Most Waiver and Estoppel as to Right to Claim or
Cited Cases
Estoppel flows from actual consequences produced by to Deny Liability for Compensation
413k1 1 I4 k. Estoppel Of, or Waiver By,
conduct of A on B regardless of whether A intended those
consequences; it is immaterial whether conduct falsely Employer, or Insurance Carrier. Most Cited Cases
Employer's unintentional-hut-misleading statements to
misrepresented situation or fraudulently concealed truth.
claimaht that claimant did not have workers'compensation
coverage because of part-time nature of her work were
sufficient to constitute estoppel and prevent employer and
Workers' Compensation 413 -1300
State from invoking statute of limitations as a defense,
since claimant had valid, meritorious claim that was not
filed because of reliance upon employer's representation.
41 3 Workers' Compensation
Proceedings to Secure Compensation
W.S. 1977, $ 27-12-503.
41 3XVI(F) Claims for Compensation
4 13XVI(F)4 Excusing Want Of, or Defect or
Delay in Making Claim
"1049 Donald L. Painter, Casper, for appellant.
413kl300 k. Discretion of Court or Board to A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy
Excuse Delay or Waive Strict Compliance. Most Cited Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Fen., and
Cases
Terry J: Hams, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), forappellee.
If workers' compensation claimant has valid claim which
is lost because of some action by employer or insurance
provider reasonably relied upon by claimant to her Before THOMAS,E C.J., and ROSE, R O O N E Y , E
detriment, relief should be granted.
BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

-

Workers' Compensation 413 -71

FN* Became Chief Justice January 1, 1985
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FN**Chief Justice at time of oral argument.
CARDME, Justice.
JIJ The parties in this case stipulated to the following
facts: The town of Saratoga had taken over supervision of
the ambulanceservice from Carbon Countyapproximately
thirty days prior to this injury. The appellant was
employed part time by the town of Saratoga as a member
of the ambulance service. Shesuffered amptured eardrum
in the course of her employment on December 14, 1981,
and sought medical treatment the next day. She was
advised by her supervisor that she was not covered by
worker's compensation because she was a part-time
employee.=

FNThe dissenting opinion of Justice Rooney
is misleading when it states:
"It is difficult to treat Ann White's advice,
given in the doctor's office while treating
appellant on behalf of the doctor, as being
given on behalf of the Town of Saratoga * *

*

$,

No one testified in this case. Nowhere in the
record is it stated that Ann White's advice was
given in the doctor's office while treating
appellant. The case was presented to the trial
court upon stipulated facts, agreed to by the
parties. With respect to this matter, the
stipulation states:
"When the subject injury occurred, and
thereafter, Employee had considerable
conversation and consultation with the same
Ann White, who did not believe that Worker's
Compensation coverage existed because of the
minimal part-time nature of the occupation."

Further, appellee conceded that Ann White
was acting on behalf of the town of Saratoga
when it agreed in its brief that:
"In the case at bar, the employer, Town of
Saratoga, did no more than give bad advice
which was the result of an honest mistake as to
the existenceinon-existence of coverage.''
Tlie appellee havingstipulated that the town of
Saratoga gave bad advice as a result of an
honest mistake, it is inappropriate to suggest
the contrary by stating that Ann White "was
probably acting as a nurse for an attending
physician at the time" (emphasis added) in a
private capacity when she advised appellant
concerning coverage under worker's
compensation.

121 Appellant underwent surgery on March 24, 1982. In
March 1983, when it became apparent that additional
surgery would be necessary, appellant requested that the
hospital apply for payment under worker's compensation.
The second surgery for the injury that occurred during her
employment was performed on April 6, 1983. At that time
she again discussed worker's compensation with the chief
executive officer of her employer, the mayor of Saratoga,
who agreed that she should he covered. Appellant then,
during April 1983, attempted to file a worker's
compensation*1050 claim. The clerk of court rejected the
claim because it was not timely fi1ed.m Appellant was
allowed to file her claim on July 19, 1983. The court,
thereafter, determined that the claim was barred by the
statute of limitations.
FN2. Section 27-12-601(a), W.S. 1977, states in
part:

O 2008 Thomson ReutersiWest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Page 4

695 P.2d 1048
695 P.2d 1048
(Cite as: 695 P.2d 1048)
compensation."
"[Tlhe clerk or his designee shall review the
reports of the injury to ascertain whether the
case should be docketed."
However, 5 27-12-602(a), W.S.1977,requires
that * * * the judge shall set the case for
hearing at the earliest possible date and direct
notice of the hearing to be issued by the clerk
of the court * * *." In situations where there is
a dispute as to the right of the employee to
compensation or the amount to be awarded, a
right to a hearing is provided. The procedural
protections include the right to a judicial
decision on the matter. It is not within the
province of the clerk of court to determine
whether cases are barred by the statute of
limitations. See, R.L. ManninpCo. v. MillsapL
Wvo.. 687 P.2d 252 (19841 and Herrine v.
Welltech.'lnc.. Wvo., 660 P.2d 361 (1983r
"

We reverse.
The only issue presented by appellant is: 'Whether
Appellant has a legally, excusable reason for failure to
comply wit11 $ 27-12-503, W.S.1977." This statute
provides in part:
"(a) No order or award for compensation involving an
injury which is the result of a single brief occurrence
rather than occurring over a substantial period of time,
shall be made unless in addition to the reports of the
injury, an application or claim for award is filed with the
clerk of court in the county in which the injury occurred,
within one (1) year after the day on which the injury
occurred or for injuries not readily apparent, within one
(I) year after discovery of the injury by theemployee. The
reports of an accident do not constitute a claim for

We stated in In re Martini, 38 Wvo. 172. 265 P. 707
(1928).that the legislature had fixed the applicable time in
which a claim could be filed and, therefore, an exception
could not be read into the law because the result would be
legislation rather than statutory construction. We,
however, expressly did not resolve the question here
presented, stating:
"Whether the limitation, notwithstanding the fact that it is
said to be jurisdictional, may be waived under certain
circumstances, as is held by some of the courts, need not
be decided, for the question does not arise here. It is clear
that without such waiver, the limitation is, under the
authorities already cited, mandatory." (Emphasis added.)
In re Martini, suvra, 265 P. at 708-709.
The question we treat here does not involve statutory
construction. The statute is clear and unambiguous. It
contains no provision for tolling because of excusable
neglect or to relieve hardship in particular circumstances.
Thus, the statute here has nm and is a bar to this claim
unless the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents raising
the statute-of-limitations defense.
It is established policy that worker's compensation statutes
and the law applicable thereto should be liberally
construed to the end that just claims of workers will be
paid whenever possible. Jurisdictions such as ours, with
statutes not providing tolling for excusable neglect, apply
waiver 01' equitable estoppel to prevent the employer from
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense where the
lateness was the result of the employer's assurances,
misrepresentations, negligence, or fraudulent deceptions.
3 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation $ 78.45.
There are no jurisdictions which always hold their
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statutes of limitation to be a total bar in worker's Wyoming) reasonably relied upon by the employee to her
compensation cases. All jurisdictions allow late filings detriment, relief should be granted.
under some circumstances. These circumstances range
from good faith misrepresentations by employers to a
FN3. Chief Justice Thomas in his dissenting
requirement of deliberate and actual fraud. Fraud, either
opinion relies upon Turner v. Turner, Wvo.. 582
actual or legal, will toll the statute of limitations, &r&g
P.2d 600 (1978L for his conclusion that this
1,. Aerna Casualhi & Sureh~Ca., 147 Ga.App. 662. 249
court for all time committed itself to the
S.E.2d 661 (19781, as will a reasonable reliance on
proposition that the doctrine of equitable
incorrect information and active misleading conduct.
estoppel will arise only where action of the
Cohen 1,. indus/rial Comm'n ofArizona, 133 Ariz. 24,648
employer lulls the employee "into a false sense
P.2d 139 (1982). "1051 Thus, where the failure Lo file
of security or causes him to believe he will be
the claim resulted from the direct intervention of the
taken care of without filing a claim."
employer's agents and all parties believed that the accident
Fraudulently misrepresenting to the employee
was not covered by worker's compensation, equitable
that he is not covered by worker's compensation,
estoppel prevented the defense of statute of limitations.
knowing that to be false, for the purposc of
Levo v, Generai-Slzea-Morrison,128 Mont. 570.280 P.2d
causing him not to file a claim would not "lull"
1086 (1955). Estoppel flows from theactualconsequences
him into a false sense of security. And so it
produced by the conduct of A on B regardless of whether
would seem that an employee can be "lulled"
A intended those consequences or not.
into a false sense of security only where the
MaplewoodPackinxCo.. Me.. 375 A.2d 534 (1977). It is
employer promises something, such as the
immaterial whether the conduct falsely misrepresented the
payment of a sum of money in settlement or
situationor fraudulently concealed the ttuth. The employer
payment of his medical bills thus making it
is estopped to plead the statute of limitations. Cambron v.
unnecessary for him to file a worker's
Co-operative Dislributinp Co., Kv., 405 S.W.2d 687
compensation claim. The Chief Justice, here, is
(1966); Pacific Emoloverslns. Co. v. Industrial Accident
taking about the doctrine of promissory
Conzm'n, 66 Cal.App.2d 376, 152 P.2d 501 (19441. Where
estoppel. 28 Am.Jur2d Estoppel and Waiver 6
the employer's carrier gave information with no intent to
tf8. See also, Anno., Promises to Settle or
deceive or mislead but his conduct did just that, estoppel
Perfonn as Estopping Reliance on Statute of
applied because the employer, having assisted the
Limitations. 44 A.L.R3d 482. 488 (19721
employee, could not complain about action taken or not
wherein it is stated that:
taken. Roherl.son v. Bri.~sev!~
Garape, Inc., 270 S.C. 58,
240 S.E.2d 810 (1978). The employer is estopped when
the claimant is deceived; the deception occurs when the
"Oneof thebroadest generalizations employed
employee i s lulled into a false sense of security.
by the courts as a starting point is a statement
Tarljmetti v. Workmen'sCompensation Au~ealBoard 63
to the effect that one cannot justly or equitably
Pa.Cmwlth. 456. 439 A.2d 844 (1981); Ashcraft v.
lull his adversary into a false sense of security
Hunfer, 268 Ark. 946. 597 S.W.2d 124 ( A u p . 1 9 8 0 ) . ~
* * *,"
But fraud should not be the *I052 only basis for relief in
worker's compensation cases. The limitation period is
short-just one year. The injury resulting to the worker
This is the starting point, not the end. In
during the course of her employment is our concern. If she
Turner v. Turner, supra, parties to the lawsuit
bas a valid claim which is lost because of some action by
were making offers and counter offers of
the employer or the insurance provider (here the state of

-
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settlement, dealing at arms length, when the
statute of limitations expired. There was no
firm settlement or promise to pay, and plaintiff
was not lulled into believing the litigation was
settled when the statute expired. Turner v.
Turner, supra, dealt with offersipromises, not
misrepresentations of fact.
In the instant case, no promises were made to
the worker, no offers of settlement nor promise
to pay her med~calbills were made, and she
could not be lulled into a false sense of
securlty under these circumstances. She was
simply given false information by her
employer concerning her right to have her
surgery covered by worker's compensation. To
say that equitable estoppel will apply if her
employer makes a false promise, but will not
apply iT he makes a false statement, is
irrational. That is not the holding of Turner v.
Turner, supra, which also stated:
'[A]ctual Craud in the technical sense, bad
faith or intent to mislead are not essential to
the creation of an estoppel, but it is sufficient
that the defendant made misrepresentaiiona u1
so conducted himself that he misled a pasty,
who acted thereon in good faith, to the extent
that such party failed to commence the action
within the statutory period * * *.' " At p. 602
(quoting from In re Piener's Estate, 224
Cal.App.2d 670, 37 Cal.Rptr. 46 (19641).

period of limitation provided by the statute.
Better that we lay that matter to rest now. The
rule proposed by the dissent is not the majority
mle, nor are the cases listed for that
proposition the "better reasoned opinions."
Finally, it is stated that the cases cited in the
opinion of the court "do not all stand for the
propositions for which they are cited * * *."
The cases referred to were not cited for their
holdings, but are merely illustrative of the
approach of various courts of the application
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to raising
the bar of the statute of limitations in worker's
compensation cases.

In McKaskle v. Industrial Comm'n ofArizona, 135 Ariz.
168,659 P.2d 1313 (19821 theinjured employeewas told
by the employer that he was not covered by worker's
compensation because he was an independent contractor
and not an employee. Later he learned that he was
covered. The court stated:

"

If we hold as the dissenting opinion suggests
now, it would be only amatter of timeuntil we
would have before us a case in which an
employer falsely and fraudulently
misrepresented to an employee his rightsunder
worker's compensation for theexpress purpose
of inducing him not to file a claim within the

"The claimant may be equally harmed by his reasonable
i-&fifii.a 6~ ci:hc; 'i;c;si$.,c'
-:'ze~&:e' cssertisns. Nor
are we persuaded that a characterization of coverage or
compensability as a 'question of law' renders the principle
of estoppel inapplicable." Id. 659 P.2d at 1317- 1318.
In Leva v. General-Shea-Morrison. suora, thecourt stated:
"The doctrine of equitable estoppel is a flexible one,
founded in equity and good conscience; its object is to
prevent a party from taking an unconscionable advantage
of his own wrong while asserting his strict legal rights.
Seemingly the only strict legal right that we are asked to
adhere to is the statute which was passed solely for the
benefit of the employer and the insurance carrier, i.e., the
Statute of limitations.
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applied to the town of Saratoga,
"It is contended that there is involved a question of law as
opposed to a question of fact and that the claimant is as
responsible for knowing the law regarding the situation as
were the insurance company, the employer, the industrial
accident board and those others involved. However, even
if we were to ascribe to the contention that i t is solely a
question of law, it would be a v e v narrow construction of
the statutes regarding Workmen's Compensation if this
court were to say that a claimant should find it his duty to
examine all the technicalities concerning the Workmen's
Compensation Act and come to a right conclusion while
the employer and the insurance carrier, whose
responsibilities are far greater, should be excused because
of their misinterpretation of the Act itself, which
misinterpretation the etnployer in turn foisted offupon the
claimant." 280 P.2d at 1090.

* * * it would not be appropriate as to the Appellee State
of Wyoming, as the Appellee State of Wyoming not only
administers and defends the Town of Saratoga's industrial
accident account, but also all the monies in the worker's
compensation fund."
"

Section 27-12-608, W.S.1977, provides:
"The director or his designee may for any reason appear
in the district court and defend against any claim andshall
in all respects have the same rights of defense as the
employer. Failure to contest*1053 a claim does not
constitute waiver by the director of his right to reopen an
award where he does not appear and defend at the original
trial." (Emphasis added.)

The purpose of this statute is to establish the rights of the
State "as broad as the right of the employer and employee,
so as to give the state full measure of protection."
Wvomina~tateTreasurer, er rel. Workerk ~ o m ~ e n s a t i o n
Div. v. Svoboda. Wvo., 573 P.2d41 7x420 (19781, quoting
Mamh v. Aljoe. 41 Wvo. 220. 227. 284 P. 260 (1930).
Althoueh the worker's com~ensationdivision of the state
of Wyoming is granted rights as broad as those of the
employer, there is nothing in the statute which confers
greater rights or would permit the State to assert defenses
not available to the employer.

The State here contends that estoppel is not warranted
because the bad advice was merely an honest mistake and
cites Larson for the proposition,

"[ilf the employer's had advice was the result of an honest
mistake due to the uncertain state of the law at the time,
estoppel is not warranted." 3 Larson, The Law of
Workmen's Compensation C) 78.45.

-

The basis for thatstatement is acaliforniacase which held
that the city's advice was reasonable when given "due to
the uncertain state of the law" at that time. CiN
ofLos
Anaeles v Jnduslrial Accident Commission. 63 Cal.2d
255.46 Cal.RDtr. 105,404 P.2d 809 (1965). In the instant
case, the state of the law is not uncertain. The worker here
was covered by worker's compensation. That is not
disputed, And had she, contrary to the advice of her
employer, filed a claim, it would have been paid.

f
7
JAppellant had a valid, meritorious claim that was not
filed because of reliance upon her employer's
representation that she was not covered by worker's
compensation. We hold that the employer's misleading
statements. althoueh unintentional. were sufficient to
constitute estoppel and prevent the employer and the state
of Wyoming from invoking the statute of limitations as a
defense. This case is, therefore, reversed and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

-

N T h e State also contends that even if estoppel shouldbe
J
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THOMAS, Chief Justice, dissenting.
I must dissent from the decision of the majority of the
court in this instance. In Turner v. Turner, Wyo., 582 P.2d
600 (19782 this court dealt with the question of estoppel
to assert the bar of the statute of limitations. That case did
not involve a claim for worker's compensation, but my
examination of the law in this area does not disclose any
distinction between worker's compensationcases andother
cases with respect lo theapplication of equitable estoppel.

Pa.Cmwlth. 456. 439 A.2d 844 (19811, for example, the
court held that estoppel did not prevent the assertion of the
statute, because while the employee was confused, the
employee was not lulled by the employer's conduct.

With respect to the authorities reliedupon by the majority
opinion, my reading of several of those cases persuades
me that a strict application of the concept of ratio
decidendi results in a conclusion that they do not all stand
for the propositions for which they are cited, although
there is broad language included which could lead one to
the interpretation placed upon them by the majority. In
Tazlianeitiv. work in en!^ Cornpemafio~zAnnealBoard,
63

Appellant recognized that she had suffered a compensable
injury on December 14, 1981. The claim was not filed
until April, 1983. See Baldwin v. SarNion, 50 WYO.508,
62 P.2d 531. 108 A.L.R. 304 11936); Remis v. Texaco,
Wvo., 401 P.2d 708 (1965). The statutory time limit in
which lo file a claim had expired.

The decisions in those cases which have limited estoppel
to instances in which the employee was lulled in such a
way that the claim was not asserted, hut do not permit
estoppel where the employee was informed that there was
no coverage, are consistent with what we said in Turner v.
It appears that Ann White's role at the time that she spoke Turner, supra The statement by White that there was no
with the appellant may have been equivocal. ~ v e n worker's compensation coverage would not be conduct
assuming that she was acting as an agent of the Town of which wouldjustify*1054 an estoppel against the town to
Saratoga, the strongest interpretation that can be given to raise the statute of limitations.
the stipulated information is that she stated there was no
coverage. I am satisfied that the better reasoned opinions,
which I believe represent a majority mIe, dealing with the For these reasons I would affirm the judgment of the trial
denial ofcoverageor liability hold that the employer is not court.
estopped from asserting the defense of the statute of ROONEY, Justice, dissenting.
limitations.
Lee v. Kinzberlv-Clark Cornoration, The majority opinion correctly accepts the fact that the
Aia.Civ.Au~..418 So.2d 164 (1982); Joyce v. Paul statute of limitations, without more, would bar appellant's
Haljes Arnoco Service Station, 161 Ga.Apu. 373, 288 claim. The legislature has so provided:
S.E.2d 266 (1 9821; Miller v. Olinkrafi, Inc., La.Aup.,
395 So.2d 902 (1 98 1); Drane v. City o f New Orleans,
La.Aup.. 328 So.2d 752 (1976); Kohlbeck v. Citv of "(a) No order or award for compensation involving an
injury which is the result of a single brief occurrence
Omaha. 2 11 Neb. 372.3 18 N.W.2d 742 (1 982);
rather than occurring over a substantial period of time,
v. Slrick Trailer Co.. 10 Pa.Cmwlth. 518. 312 A.2d 471
shall be made unless in addition to the reports of the
(1973)- and Trzoniec v. General Controls Co., 100 R.I.
448, 2 16 A.2d 886 (1966). These cases distinguish injury, an application or claun for award is filed with the
between the denial of liability and conduct which lulls the clerk of court in the county in which the injury occurred,
employee into a false sense of security or causes h i to within one (1) year after the day on which the injury
occurred * * *." Section 27-12-503(a), W.S. 1977.
believe he will be taken care of without filing a claim.
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Nor does appellant's situation afford to her the exception
to the limitation period provided by the legislature:
"If an injured employee is mentally incompetent or a
minor, or where death results from the injury if any of his
dependents are mentally incompetent or minors, at the
time when any right or privilege accrues under this act [$$
27-1 2-101 through 27-12-8041, no limitation of time
provided for in this act shall run so long as the
incompetent or minor has no guardian." Section
27-12-505, W.S.1977.

Was Ann White speaking as a nurse for Dr. Lunt? Or was
she speaking as a part-time employee supervisor of the
EMT unit on Saratoga's airplane ambulance? And, if the
latter, did she have authority to waive the statute of
limitations on behalf of Saratoga or to act or speak on
behalf of Saratoga in this matter so as to estop Saratoga
from application ofthestatuteof limitations? It is difficult
to treatAnn White's advice, given in the doctor's office
while treating appellant on behalf of the doctor, as being
given .on behalf of the Town of Saratoga under these
circumstances.

* * * The doctrine of implied agency or ostensible
authority applied to private parties or corporations is
limited very much, so far as municipal corporations are
concerned ' * *." S. Goldberz & Co. v. Citv of Cedar
Rapids, 200 Iowa 139,204 N.W. 216 119252.

"

Nonetheless, the majority opinion finds an exception to
the statute of limitations in a waiver by the employer of an
estoppel through the acts of the employer. With this, I
disagree.
In the first place, I question the assumption that the
employer was involved in any waiver or estoppel.
Appellant does not contend for any fraudulent or
intentionally deceptive action on the part of the employer.
In her brief, appellant states, " * * * we do not contend the
Employee was deceived any more than negligently by Ann
White * * *." Ann White was a Nurse Practitioner in the
office ofDr. John Lunt, M.D., in ~aratoga.Carbon County
maintains an airplane ambulance for flights from Carbon
County to Laramie, Denver, etc. Ann Whiteand appellant
worked part timeon theambulanceEMTcrew. Annwhite
was the supervisor of the crew. About thirty days before
appellant suffered a ruptured eardrum on a flight of the
airplane ambulance, the Town of Saratoga had taken over
the operation of the airplane ambulance from the county.
The day after her injury, appellant sought medical
attention from Dr. Lunt, where she was treated by Ann
White. It was Ann White's statement that she did not
believe worker's compensation coverage existed for 'the
injury because of the part-time nature of the employment
which is the basis for the claimed estoppel or waiver
against the Town of Saratoga.

*I055 The Iowa court pointed out that the extent of
authority is a matter of record in statutes and ordinances
for municipal matters and not known only to the principal
and agent as is the case with private parties.
The only reasonable appraisal of the situation is that
appellant could not have relied on Ann White's comments
as those of the town. She should be charged with
knowledge contained in the placard which is required to
be posted by every employer, and which sheis taken to
have read. It notified her of the necessity of filing a timely
claim.. She should not be allowed to rely on advice
received from another part-time employee, albeit a
supervisor of a limited and special activity who was
probably acting as a nurse for an attending physician at the
time, for a waiver of the statute of limitations by the
employer or to establish an estoppel against the employer
to assert such statute.
Inasmuch as the privilege of the statute of limitations is
personal, a waiver, in this instance, can only be by the
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Town of Saratoga or someone empowered to act for it.
Slrvke~v Rasch 57 Wvo. 34. 112 P.2d 570, 136 A.L.R.
m r e h . denied I 13 P.2d 963 (1 94 1
1The power to act for
a municipality in most respects is statutorily given to the
governing body of the municipality. Section 15-1-103,
W.S.1977. See
15-2-201 and 15-2-202, W.S.1977; re
restrictions on acceptance of claims by governing bodies
of towns.

Finally, the advice given by Ann White pertained to a
matter of law.

"The well-recognized rule is that a represenlation as to a
matter of law will not ordinarily support an action for
fraud or deceit, nor constitute an estoppel to rely upon the
statute of limitations', the reason for the rule being that
representations as to matters of law are ordinarily
considered as expressions of opinion, and justifiable
reliance cannot be had upon the mere opinion of another.
* * * " 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitations of Actions 6 451. D.
913 (1970).

I would affirm.

Wyo.,1985.
Bauer v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation
Div.
695 P.2d 1048
END OF DOCUMENT
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
QUINTON BUNN,

)

Claimant,
v.
HERlTAGE SAFE COMPANY,

)

1
1
1

IC 2005-509704

I
Employer,

ORDER DENYING
RECONSIDERATION
)

and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORPORATION,

1

Surety,
Defendants.

INDUSTRIAL COlWMlss~ohi

Pursuant to Idaho Code $ 72-718, Claimant moves for reconsideration of the
Commission's October 10, 2008 decision in the above-referenced case. Claimant objects to the
Coinmission's finding that Claimant was not misled by Defendants for purposes of Idaho Code 5
72-706(1). Claimant also objects to the Commission's finding that Claimant did not receive
colnpensation from Defendants within the meaning of Idaho Code $ 72-706(2). Defendants
reply that Claimant's motion constitutes a request to re-weigh evidence and arguments already
considered and ruled upon. Defendants ask the Commission to deny Claimant's motion.
The Commissioll agrees with Defendants that Claimant's arguments on both issues have
already been considered. The Commission carefully examined and weighed all evidence and
arguments before rendering its original decision and remains unpersuaded by Claimant's
arguments

ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION - 1

Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
DATED this

@day of December, 2008,
WDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

@.J

day of December, 2008 a true and correct copy of Order
I hereby certify that on the
Denying Reconsideration was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following:
KENT A HIGGINS
PO BOX 99 1
POCATELLO ID 83204-0991
E SCOTT HARMON
PO BOX 6358
BOISE ID 83707

ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION - 2

DAVE R. GALLAFENT
KENT L. HAWKINS*
THOMAS W. CLARK
THOMAS J. LYONS
BRENDON C. TAYLOR
KENT A. HIGGINS*
IAN C. JOHNSON
JARED A. STEADMAN
R. WILLIAM HANCOCK
ALSO ADMITTED M UTAH
+ALSO ADMITTED W IOWA

MERRILL & MERRILL
CHARTERED
COUNSELORS AND ATTORNEYS AT LAW

-

109 N. ARTHUR 5'" FLOOR
P.O. BOX 9 9 1

POCATELLO, I D A H O 83204-0991

January 2,2009

hdurtlisi Commissicjn
Judicial Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0041
Re:

Quinton Bunn v. Heritage Safe Co. and Liberty Northwest
I.C. No. 2005-509704

Dear Sirs:
Enclosed for filing is Notice of Appeal. Thank you.
With best regards,
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED

Enclosure

A.L. MERRILL ( 1 886-1 9 6 0
R.D. MERRILL (1 893.1 9 7 2 )
W.F. MERRILL ( I 919-2005)

Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Idaho State Bar #3025
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

QUINTON BUNN,
ClaimantlAppellant,

)
)
)

I.C. No. 2005-509704

VS.
HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY,

)
)
)

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Idaho Code 5 72-724

Employer,
and
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INS. COW.,
Surety,
DefendantsIRespondents.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS
Heritage Safe and Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp.
AND ITS ATTORNEY
E. Scott Harmon
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY

Notice of Appeal
0:\69\6943E'leadingsWotice of Appeal.wpd

Page 1

4

P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358
AND THE CLERK OF THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
The above named appellant, Quinton Bunn, through his attorney, Kent A. Higgins,
1.
appeal against the above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order entered in
the above entitled matter on the 10th of October, 2008, and the Order Denying Reconsideration riled
December 17,2008.
The parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment or
or&: describe:! in paragraph ! ~ b o v essp agpez!able prxsuan! to h ! e 1!(a)(!) end 14 (h) of the
Idaho Appellate Rules.

2.

3.

4.

The issues of this appeal are as follows:
(a)

Whether the commission erred in deciding that medical treatment is not
compensation.

(b)

Whether the commission erred in finding that an erroneous denial letter to a
claimant is not misleading.

(c)

Whether the commission erred in finding the statute of limitations for filing
Claimant's claim expired.

(d)

To the extent, if any, the commission's findings may be construed to imply
that medical treatment was not obtained for claimant by his employer,
whether any such findings are based in law or fact.

A reporter's transcript is requested of the trial, however a transcript has alreadybeen

obtained.
The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record
5.
in addition to those automaticallyincluded under Rule 28, I.A.R.: Briefs on Motion to Reconsider.
6.

I certify:

That a copy ofthis noticeof appeal and any request for additional transcript have been
(a)
served on the reporter, or the rules requirements of I.C. 3 72-725 are met.
That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the
@)
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
Notice of Appeal
0:\69\6943PleadingsWotice of Appeal.wpd
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(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has been paid.

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

20.

q
Dated this &day

of January, 2 0 0 d
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, one of the attorneysfor the Claimant, in the
a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
upon the following in the manner indicated below:
E. Scott Harmon
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358

matter, do hereby

[
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Telefax

RECEIVED
lTtfl,i?D StJPREifE C(jIlRT
t!.;rPriT i;F [;PpEAi.S
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
n

QUNTON BUNN,

swmm C o m T No. 3
Claimant-Appellant,

v.

HERITAGE SAFE. COMPANY, Employer,
and LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Surety,
Defendants-Respondents.

hJ ~

)
) CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
)
(QUINTON BUNN)
)
)

1
1
)

Appeal From:

Industrial Commission Chairman James F. Kile presiding.

Case Number:

IC 2005-509704

Order Appealed &om:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER ENTERED OCTOBER 10,
2008; AND ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION
ENTERED DECEMBER 17,2008

Attorney for Appellant:

Kent A. Higgins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

Attomey for Respondents:

E. Scott Harmon
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707

Appealed By:

QUNTON BUNN, Claimant

Appealed Against:

HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY, Employer, and LIBERTY
NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORPORATION, Surety,

Notice of Appeal Filed:

January 5,2009

Appellate Fee Paid:

NONE

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OF QLJINTON BUNN - 1

Name of Reporter:

Sandra Beebe
P.O. Box 658
Blackfoot, ID 83221

Transcript Requested:

The entire standard transcript has been requested.
The standard transcript has been prepared and
is on file with the Industrial Commission.

Dated:

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OF QUINTON BUNN - 2

CERTIFICATION

I, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho,
hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy of the NOTICE OF
APPEAL FILED JANUARY 5,2009; FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER ENTERED OCTOBER 10, 2008; AND
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION ENTERED DECEMBER 17, 2008, RE:
QUINTON BUNN'S SUPREME COURT APPEAL, herein, and the whole thereof.

Dated the 5TH day of JANUARY, 2009.

Assistant Commission Secretary:

k*ee+.

'*', t+-%0 F*...
ID b
@
*%

CERTIFICATION

,,,,,,,,**+*''

,,.*

?

CERTIElCATION OF RECORD
I, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission, do hereby certify
that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and papers
designated to be included in the Agency's Record on appeal by Rule 28(3) of the Idaho
Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b).
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are
correctly listed in the Certificate of Exhibits (i). Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme
Court upon settlement of the Transcript and Record herein.
DATED at Boise, Idaho this

day of MARCH, 2009.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD - 1

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

QUINTON BUNN,

)

Claimant-Appellant,
v.
HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY, Employer,
and LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Surety,
Defe~ldants-Respondents.

TO:

) SUPREME COURT NO. 36024-2009

1
1

) NOTICE OF COMPLETION

1
)
)

STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK OF THE COURTS;
AND KENT A. HIGGINS, ESQ., FOR CLAlMANT QUINTON BUNN;
AND E. SCOTT HARMON, ESQ., FOR DEFENDANTS HERITAGE SAFE
COMPANY, EMPLOYER AND LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORPORATION, SURETY.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTDFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date,
and, pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:
Kent A. Higgins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

E. Scott Harmon
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707

You are further notified that, pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all
parties have hveizty-eiglzt days from this date in which to file objections to the Record,
including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no objections to the
Agency's Record are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the !Transcript and Record
shall be deemed sealed.
DATED at Boise, Idaho this

NOTICE OF COMPLETION - 1

10TH day of MARCH, 2009.

